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INTRODUCTION
Fairness is a foundational concept in American jurisprudence.1 Yet when
evaluating our system of civil procedure, debate surrounds how to reconcile the
competing ends of our civil justice system.2 While scholars agree that our civil
justice system must vindicate rights,3 deter wrongful conduct,4 respect human

* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University, Maurer School of Law. For their generous insights and feedback, I thank participants of Indiana University’s Social Psychology
Seminar Series (Jan. 2014); the Social Psychology & Law Pre-Conference and the annual
meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology (SPSP) (Jan. 2014), the inaugural meeting of Psychology and Lawyering: Coalescing the Field (Feb. 2014); the University of Illinois College of Law’s Junior Faculty Exchange (Apr. 2014), the A2J Empirical
Methods Workshop (Apr. 2014), and the annual meeting of the Law & Society Association
(LSA) (May 2014). In particular, I thank Tom Tyler, Donna Shestowsky, Rich Wiener, Jennifer Robbennolt, Kenworthey Bilz, Arden Rowell, Tonya Brito, Amanda Ward, KT Albiston, Becky Sandefur, Anna Carpenter, Alyx Mark, Colleen Shanahan, Jessica Steinberg, Jim
Sherman, Joe Hoffmann, Jeffrey Stake, Jason DuMont, Laura Foster, Alberto Varon, and
Mary Murphy for their insight and encouragement. Last, this research would not be possible
without the insights early on shared by members of the Indiana University Mind & Identity
in Context Lab and the members of my own Law & Social Psychology Lab, thanked, infra
note 22. Errors of thought and expression are solely my own.
1
See ROBERT M. COVER & OWEN M. FISS, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE 2–3 (1979);
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 113 (1977) (“The gravitational force of a
precedent may be explained by appeal, not to the wisdom of enforcing enactments, but to the
fairness of treating like cases alike.”); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,
92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 388 (1978) (“By and large it seems clear that the fairness and effectiveness of adjudication are promoted by reasoned opinions.”); H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any
Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 178 (1955); John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PHIL.
REV. 164, 164 (1958), reprinted in JUSTICE AND SOCIAL POLICY 80 (Frederick A. Olafson
ed., 1961) [hereinafter Rawls, Justice as Fairness]; John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the
Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 3, 9–10 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964) [hereinafter
Rawls, Legal Obligation].
2
William James vividly discussed the problem of reconciling different ends and purposes in
one of his finest works, Pragmatism. See WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR
SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING 99 (2010) (“Our different purposes also are at war with each
other. Where one can’t crush the other out, they compromise; and the result is again different
from what anyone distinctly proposed beforehand. . . . Whoever claims ABSOLUTE teleological unity, saying that there is one purpose that every detail of the universe subserves,
dogmatizes at his own risk.”).
3
See e.g., Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, WalMart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 113–18 (2011); Michael J.
Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And
Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1217–25 (1992); see also RONALD DWORKIN, Principle,
Policy, Procedure, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72, 73 (1985); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One’s Rights—Part I, 1973
DUKE L.J. 1153, 1202 (1974).
4
See e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (1879); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169, 176–77 (1968); Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay:
The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845 (2001); Joanna C.
Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement
Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2010).

884

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:882

dignity,5 and enhance social welfare and efficiency,6 scholars disagree on how
best to reconcile these ends.7 Doubtless, the tension between these plural ends
poses difficulty when courts, civil rule designers, and legislators balance and
weigh the costs and benefits of different civil procedural rules and constitutional safeguards under the Due Process Clause. Notably, courts face this vexing
difficulty when conducting the cost-benefit analysis envisioned by Mathews v.
Eldridge under the Due Process Clause,8 and upon amendment of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts will face this difficulty under newly
amended Rule 1.9
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court enacted, under the Due Process
Clause, a cost-benefit analysis that courts conduct when a claimant challenges
as insufficient the procedural safeguards in place when a state actor revokes
life, liberty, property, or vital public benefits,10 including social security benefits, unemployment compensation, aid to dependent children, veteran benefits,
5

See e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV. 28, 49–50 (1976); Michelman, supra note 3, at 1177; see also COVER & FISS,
supra note 1, at 2.
6
See e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 114 n.72
(2002); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 6 (5th ed. 1998); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 399, 399 (1973).
7
Compare Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979)
(“The function of legal process, as that concept is embodied in the Constitution . . . is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions.”), with Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 34 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Finally, apart from avoiding the risk of actual error, this Court has stressed the
importance of adopting procedures that preserve the appearance of fairness . . . .”), and Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980). See generally COVER & FISS, supra note 1, at
2; GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & MICHELE TARUFFO, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE: AN
INTRODUCTION 215 (1993) (“The fundamental problem for American civil justice is to accommodate these ideals—equality, access, autonomy, and openness in civil justice—to the
reality that their fulfillment entails economic, political, and moral costs.”); Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in Comparative Context: The United
States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 675 (1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Metaprocedure,
98 YALE L.J. 945, 947–55 (1989) (reviewing ROBERT M. COVER, OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH
RESNIK, PROCEDURE (1988)); Michelman, supra note 3, at 1213; Alan B. Morrison, The Necessity of Tradeoffs in a Properly Functioning Civil Procedure System, 90 OR. L. REV. 993,
993–97 (2012); Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 844–59 (1984).
8
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
9
See FED. R. CIV. P. 1. The Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure proposed an
amendment to Rule 1, which was approved by the Judicial Conference on September 14,
2014. The amendment was approved by the U.S. Supreme Court on April 1, 2015. Absent
congressional action, the new rule will take effect on December 1, 2015. See Memorandum
from Judge David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure to
Judge Jeffrey Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (June
14, 2014), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports
/ST09-2014-add.pdf; Letter of Transmittal from Chief Justice John G. Roberts on Fed. Rules
of Civil Procedure to Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (April 29, 2015), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/pending-rules-amendments.
10
See Mashaw, supra note 5, at 39–57.
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and state and local welfare.11 In so doing, the Mathews Court called upon
courts to weigh the cost of providing additional procedural safeguards against
the benefit gained, with benefit narrowly defined as the degree to which additional procedures enhance the accuracy of the determination at stake.12 Since its
inception, this form of cost-benefit analysis has been challenged for failing to
encompass the full plurality, diversity, and range of human values implicated
when procedural justice is withheld, including the degree to which procedural
injustice diminishes human dignity.13 In this regard, the Mathews Court’s narrow conception of cost and benefit is now in marked tension with the form of
cost-benefit analysis that even federal agencies conduct, which broadly considers values difficult or impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity,
and fairness.14 The chasm between the cramped analysis conducted by courts
under the Due Process Clause, and the more capacious analysis conducted by
federal agencies is both deeply troubling and ironic—for the Due Process
Clause, properly understood,15 is inherently about procedural justice, fairness,
and furnishing individuals human dignity.16 This chasm raises the question of
whether the Mathews v. Eldridge conception of cost-benefit analysis under the
11

See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 783 (1964):
Because it is so hard to confine relevance and discretion, procedure offers a valuable
means for restraining arbitrary action. This was recognized in the strong procedural emphasis of
the Bill of Rights, and it is being recognized in the increasingly procedural emphasis of administrative law. The law of government largess has developed with little regard for procedure. Reversal of this trend is long overdue.
The grant, denial, revocation, and administration of all types of government largess should
be subject to scrupulous observance of fair procedures. Action should be open to hearing and
contest, and based upon a record subject to judicial review. The denial of any form of privilege
or benefit on the basis of undisclosed reasons should no longer be tolerated.

Id.
12

See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343.
See infra Part III.A.
14
See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011). See generally Cass R.
Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1369, 1380 (2014); Rachel
Bayefsky, Note, Dignity as a Value in Agency Cost-Benefit Analysis, 123 YALE L.J. 1732,
1735–41 (2014). Indeed, federal agencies have recently been encouraged and empowered to
harness the behavioral sciences in considering how the American public experiences programs when formulating policies. See Using Behavioral Sciences to Better Serve the American People, Exec. Order No. 13,70_, 80 Fed. Reg. __ (signed Sep. 15, 2015) (“To more fully
realize the benefits of behavioral insights and deliver better results at a lower cost for the
American people, the Federal Government should design its policies and programs to reflect
our best understanding of how people engage with, participate in, use, and respond to these
policies and programs.”).
15
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970); Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945); Mashaw, supra note 5, at 51; Robert S. Summers, Professor Fuller’s Jurisprudence and America’s Dominant Philosophy of Law, 92 HARV. L. REV. 433, 438 (1978).
16
See COVER & FISS, supra note 1, at 2; DWORKIN, supra note 1 (“The gravitational force of
a precedent may be explained by appeal, not to the wisdom of enforcing enactments, but to
the fairness of treating like cases alike.”); Fuller, supra note 1 (“By and large it seems clear
that the fairness and effectiveness of adjudication are promoted by reasoned opinions.”);
Hart, supra note 1, at 185; Rawls, Justice as Fairness, supra note 1; Rawls, Legal Obligation, supra note 1; Resnik, supra note 7, at 847.
13
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Due Process Clause is consistent with how the public experiences tradeoffs between procedural justice and cost. Does the public, for example, treat procedural justice as an ordinary monetizable consumer preference, or does the public
experience procedural justice as a deeply human, sacred, moral, and dignitary
value?
Further, these plural ends are forged into Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which serves as the interpretive lens for all other rules of federal civil procedure.17 Rule 1 provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”18 Doubtless, these ends are
in tension. Fair procedures entail cost. Fair procedures cause delay.19 These
procedural tradeoffs underlie much of the tension, indeterminacy, and flexibility within our civil justice system, and this tension has engendered considerable—and at times spirited—debate. Until recently, Rule 1 was merely an interpretive guide for courts. The Supreme Court, however, has recently approved
newly amended Rule 1, which now affirmatively requires parties to weigh and
strike these procedural tradeoffs. Newly amended Rule 1 states that the rules
“should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceed.”20 Soon therefore, claimants, defendants, and courts may face many of
the vexing challenges posed by Mathews v. Eldridge under newly amended
Rule 1. Yet, a crucial threshold question remains: how do members of the public experience these tradeoffs; how would members of the public, for example,
experience tradeoffs between procedural fairness and cost?
Consistent with the themes of the inaugural Conference on Psychology and
Lawyering,21 we22 draw on psychological science and harness psychological
experiments to investigate these questions. First, we examine whether the public is willing to pay to upgrade from procedural unfairness to procedural fairness. Relatedly, we examine the public’s maximum willingness to pay to en17

See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also FED. R. EVID. 102 (“[R]ules should be construed so as to
administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote
the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”).
18
See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added).
19
See Morrison, supra note 7, at 994.
20
See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added); Memorandum, supra note 9.
21
The inaugural Conference on Psychology and Lawyering: Coalescing the Field was held
at the UNLV Boyd School of Law, Las Vegas, Nevada, on February 21–22, 2014.
22
This project reflects the efforts of a village. First and foremost, I thank the tireless efforts
of my IU Law & Social Psychology Lab, and the lab members who helped to complete this
project: Michael Yontz, Sarah Kupferberg, Holly Heerdink, Annie Milkey, Taylor Ballinger,
and Samantha von Ende. Second, I thank the IU Statistical Consulting Center, and the efforts
of Thomas Arthur Jackson, Stephanie Dickinson, and Wesley Beauli. Third, I thank the insights shared by members of the IU Social Psychology Seminar Series. Last, this research
would not be possible without insights early on shared by the Mind & Identity in Context
Lab at Indiana University.
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hance procedural fairness.23 Next, we examine whether the public is willing to
accept payments to downgrade from fair process to unfair process.24 Stated another way, is the public willing to monetize and exchange the procedural justice
afforded to them? Thus, we examine the public’s minimum willingness to accept the descent from procedural justice to procedural injustice.25 Last, we examine whether these willingness-to-pay (“WTP”) and willingness-to-accept
(“WTA”) values vary with the underlying interests at stake.26 In this way, and
joining in the collective efforts of those who seek to coalesce the field of psychology and lawyering, we illustrate how Law & Psychological Science,27 a
form of naturalized legal inquiry28 and behavioral realism,29 that examines legal
problems by infusing law with insights from the psychological and behavioral
sciences, can be harnessed in the realm of civil procedure and dispute system
design30 to cast new light on vexing problems to benefit courts, procedural regulators, and legal professionals.
23

See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
25
See infra Part II.
26
See infra Part II.
27
Law & Psychological Science is an interdisciplinary method that melds empirical legal
inquiry and psychological science. See Cheryl R. Kaiser & Victor D. Quintanilla, Access to
Counsel: Psychological Science Can Improve the Promise of Civil Rights Enforcement, 1
POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 95, 102 (2014); Victor D. Quintanilla, Judicial
Mindsets: The Social Psychology of Implicit Theories and the Law, 90 NEB. L. REV. 611
(2011). Law & Psychological Science draws inspiration from several neighboring jurisprudential projects, including: Behavioral Realism; see Krieger & Fiske, supra note 27, Situationism; see generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA.
L. REV. 129 (2003); Jon Hanson & Michael McCann, Situationist Torts, 41 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1345 (2008) and New Legal Realism; see generally Mark C. Suchman & Elizabeth
Mertz, Toward a New Legal Empiricism: Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal Realism, 6
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 555 (2010).
28
See BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 31 (2007) (“Naturalism is a familiar development in
recent philosophy: indeed, it would not be wrong to say that it is the distinctive development
in philosophy over the last thirty years.”).
29
Behavioral Realism is a far-reaching means of inquiry, which bears an impulse of naturalism, one that explores gaps between a scientific consensus and untested folk wisdom incorporated and subsumed into law. The scientific consensus may arise in a variety of social science disciplines, including evolutionary biology, behavioral genetics, and psychology.
“Behavioral realism” emerged from a symposium in July 2006 discussing how advances in
social and cognitive sciences offer new jurisprudential perspectives. See generally Jerry
Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA
L. REV. 465, 490 (2010). After the symposium, jurists and social psychologists produced
several noteworthy works. See generally EUGENE BORGIDA & SUSAN T. FISKE, BEYOND
COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (2008); Linda Hamilton
Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit
Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2006).
30
For examples from the vibrant and growing field of dispute system design, see CATHY A.
COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS 19 (1996);
24
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Procedural justice measures subjective perceptions about and experiences
with the fairness and legitimacy of procedures.31 This research demonstrates
that the public cares deeply about the fairness of the process by which decisions
are made, independent from considerations about substantive outcomes.32
While the harvest of procedural justice research is truly vast, this research has
yet to interconnect with a second body of psychological research on taboo
tradeoffs. Philip Tetlock, Jonathan Baron, and colleagues have investigated taboo tradeoffs and the problem of constitutive incommensurability.33 These social psychologists have examined how sacred and protected values affect decisionmaking and result in taboo tradeoffs.34 Mainly, when members of the
public are presented with proposed exchanges between sacred values—such as
loved ones, God, justice, human beings—and money, the public experiences
sharp cognitive, affective, and behavioral resistance.35 The public has marked
difficulty commodifying these sacred values into market-price terms. While
people may be willing to pay to protect these sacred values, the public sharply
resists commodifying, monetizing, and selling sacred values. In this article, we
Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Designing Justice: Legal Institutions and Other Systems for Managing Conflict, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (2008); Lisa B. Bingham, Employment
Dispute Resolution: The Case for Mediation, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 145 (2004); Jennifer F.
Lynch, Beyond ADR: A Systems Approach to Conflict Management, 17 NEGOTIATION J. 207
(2001); Francis E. McGovern, Second-Generation Dispute System Design Issues in Managing Settlements, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 53 (2008); Mary Rowe, Organizational Systems for Dealing with and Learning from Conflict: Introduction, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
233 (2009).
31
See infra Part I.A; see also E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 65 (Melvin J. Lerner ed., 1988); Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 65, 65–68 (Joseph Sanders &
V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001).
32
See infra Part I.A; see also LIND, & TYLER, supra note 31; Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff,
The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 138–46
(2011); Tyler & Lind, supra note 31.
33
See infra Part II.B; see also Philip E. Tetlock et al., The Psychology of the Unthinkable:
Taboo Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals, 78 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 853, 853–70 (2000).
34
See infra Part II.B; see also Jonathan Baron & Joshua Greene, Determinants of Insensitivity to Quantity in Valuation of Public Goods: Contribution, Warm Glow, Budget Constraints, Availability, and Prominence, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 107 (1996); Alan Page
Fiske & Philip E. Tetlock, Taboo Trade-Offs: Reactions to Transactions That Transgress the
Spheres of Justice, 18 J. INT’L SOC’Y POL. PSYCHOL. 255, 273–85 (1997); A. Peter McGraw
et al., The Limits of Fungibility: Relational Schemata and the Value of Things, 30 J.
CONSUMER RES. 219, 219–21 (2003); A. Peter McGraw & Philip Tetlock, Taboo Trade-Offs,
Relational Framing, and the Acceptability of Exchanges, 15 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 2, 2–15
(2005); Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Protected Values and Omission Bias, 79
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 79, 79–82 (1999); Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 853–56.
35
See, e.g., Rumen Iliev et al., Attending to Moral Values, in MORAL JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING 170, 170–78 (Daniel M. Bartels et al. eds., 2009); Jonathan Baron &
Mark Spranca, Protected Values, 70 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
1, 1–4 (1997); Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 256; Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 863–
65.
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connect these two bodies of research and investigate whether psychological
science on taboo tradeoffs casts new light on how the public experiences
tradeoffs between procedural justice and cost.
The remainder of the article will proceed as follows: in part I, the article
offers a theoretical orientation, presenting social-psychological research on
procedural justice, taboo tradeoffs, relational theory, and the sacred-value protection model. In part II, the article reports an experiment conducted with
members of the American public, discussing first methods then results. In part
III, the article presents a general discussion regarding the implications of this
research on procedural regulation, including implications for the cost-benefit
analysis envisioned by Mathews v. Eldridge36 under the Due Process Clause
and concerns raised under newly amended Rule 1, and turns then to civil procedure pedagogy. Last, the article closes with next steps for this line of research
and conclusions.
I.

PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, TABOO TRADEOFFS, AND THE PROBLEM OF
CONSTITUTIVE INCOMMENSURABILITY

A. Procedural Justice
Procedural justice research measures the extent to which the public experiences legal procedures and dispute resolution as fair and legitimate. This research investigates both the formal features of procedural rules and the manner
in which decisionmakers treat disputants.37 Over the past several decades, researchers have harvested empirical findings which demonstrate that procedural
justice powerfully shapes the degree to which the public deems legal authorities
legitimate and affects the public’s acceptance and adherence to legal decisions.
Procedural justice researchers have demonstrated that experiences with procedural justice influence the public’s satisfaction with how disputes are handled.38
Researchers have, moreover, consistently shown that procedural justice influences the public’s impressions of fairness as strongly, if not more so, than substantive outcomes themselves.39 While distributive justice matters greatly, so
too does the fairness by which decisions are made.40 In brief, fair process and

36

See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
LIND & TYLER, supra note 31, at 66–67; Tyler & Lind, supra note 31, at 75–86; see, e.g.,
JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS, 1–
2 (1975).
38
Tyler & Lind, supra note 31, at 75–86; Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 25 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115, 121 (1992).
39
Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 103, 103–04 (1988); see also Lawrence B.
Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004).
40
Id.
37
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fair treatment matter independent of and apart from the favorability of outcomes.41
Procedural justice is a multifaceted42 social-psychological construct. That
is, several dimensions of the process of arriving at and announcing a decision,
as well as how the public is treated, combine to shape the public’s experiences
of procedural justice. Researchers have empirically revealed that experiences of
procedural justice are affected by several criteria, including: whether the public
is afforded a voice and heard, whether the public is granted a neutral and trustworthy decisionmaker, and whether the public is treated with dignity and respect.43 Put another way, the public cares deeply about the degree to which a
decisionmaker is ethical and honest and the extent to which that decisionmaker
behaves fairly and impartially.44 These features combine to form a positively
interrelated cluster of procedural criteria,45 which, from the public’s perspective, should be simultaneously promoted. The criteria rarely operate inde41

LIND & TYLER, supra note 31, at 67; Tyler & Lind, supra note 31, at 70, 75. See, e.g.,
THIBAULT & WALKER, supra note 37, at 3.
42
Tyler, supra note 39, at 128.
43
TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION
WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 52 (2002); Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A FourComponent Model of Procedural Justice: Defining the Meaning of a “Fair” Process, 29
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 747, 747–48 (2003); Hollander-Blumoff, supra note
32, at 140–41; Tyler & Lind, supra note 31, at 75. Tyler, supra note 39, at 104–05; Tyler &
Lind, supra note 38, at 122. These dimensions of procedural justice have a long and hallowed lineage in human experience and can be traced back to the dawn of Western civilization, in the Axial period. For example, Aeschylus, the Greek poet born around year 525 B.C.,
in Eumenides, at 360–88, narrates a discussion between Goddess Athena and the Chorus of
Furies, in which the Furies aim to deprive Orestes of voice at his trial before the judges of
Delphi. To which, Athena sharply replies:
Athena: Ye would seem just, yet work iniquity.
Furies: How? Tell me that! Thou art not poor in wisdom.
Athena: Wrong shall not triumph here by force of oaths.
Furies: Question him then and give a righteous judgment.
....
Athena: Sir, what hast thou to answer touching this?
Tell me thy land, thy lineage and all
Thy griefs; and then speak in thine own defence,
If that thou look’st for judgment; for that cause
Harbourest at my hearth; all rites performed,
A grave appellant, like Ixion old.
Come, to all this make me your clear reply.

Aeschylus, THE ORESTEIA 85–86, 227–79 (Penguin ed., 1984) (emphasis added). Similarly,
Euripides, the Greek poet born around year 480 BC, in Hippolytus, narrates a tragic sequence after King Theseus rashly asks Poseidon to curse death on his beloved son Hippolytus without first offering Hippolytus procedural justice to defend himself against false charges, to which Goddess Artemis warns, “But thou alike in [Poseidon’s] eyes and in mine hast
shewn thy evil heart, in that thou hast forestalled all proof or voice prophetic, hast made no
inquiry, nor taken time for consideration, but with undue haste cursed thy son even to the
death.” EURIPIDES, THE PLAYS OF EURIPIDES: VOLUME II 110 (Edward P. Coleridge trans.
1891) (emphasis added).
44
Tyler, supra note 39, at 121, 123.
45
Id. at 131.
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pendently and instead holistically combine to constitute experiences of procedural justice.46
Researchers have examined the downstream consequences of enhancing or
depriving procedural justice in legal and business environments. In legal environments, enhancing procedural justice promotes the public’s acceptance of legal decisions.47 Tom Tyler and colleagues, for example, have shown that the
extent to which the public experiences procedural justice shapes the public’s
adherence to law.48 In criminal proceedings, elevating procedural justice decreases recidivism.49
In business environments, imparting procedural justice promotes pro-social
and cooperative workplace behavior.50 Procedural justice, moreover, affects
commitment to organizations and institutions and diminishes workplace strife
and conflict.51 Fair process enhances commitment to organizations and institu46

Id. at 128.
See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3 (1990); Denise C. Gottfredson et
al., How Drug Treatment Courts Work: An Analysis of Mediators, 44 J. RES. CRIME &
DELINQ. 3, 3 (2007); Jonathan Jackson et al., Why Do People Comply with the Law?: Legitimacy and the Influence of Legal Institutions, 52 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1051, 1062 (2012);
E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224, 245 (1993); Jason Sunshine & Tom
Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 535 (2003); Tom R. Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legitimacy and the Exercise of Legal Authority: Motivating Compliance, Cooperation, and
Engagement, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 78, 79 (2014).
48
Tyler, supra note 38, at 130.
49
See Aziz Z. Huq et al., Why Does the Public Cooperate with Law Enforcement? The Influence of the Purposes and Targets of Policing, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 419, 419
(2011); Jackson et al., supra note 47; Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Why Do Criminals
Obey the Law? The Influence of Legitimacy and Social Networks on Active Gun Offenders,
102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 435 (2012); Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
163, 186 (1997); Elizabeth A. Stanko et al., A Golden Thread, a Presence Amongst Uniforms, and a Good Deal of Data: Studying Public Confidence in the London Metropolitan
Police 1, 4 (Apr. 20, 2011) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1815824; Tom R. Tyler et
al., Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim
Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 365, 369–71 (2010).
50
See TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE,
SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 10 (2000); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
COOPERATE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MOTIVATIONS 108 (2011); Steven L. Blader et al., Procedural Justice and Retaliation in Organizations: Comparing Cross-Nationally the Importance
of Fair Group Processes, 12 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 295, 305–06 (2001); David De
Cremer & Daan van Knippenberg, How Do Leaders Promote Cooperation? The Effects of
Charisma and Procedural Fairness, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 858, 859 (2002); David De
Cremer & Tom R. Tyler, The Effects of Trust in Authority and Procedural Fairness on Cooperation, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 639, 648 (2007); Tom R. Tyler & David De Cremer,
Process-Based Leadership: Fair Procedures and Reactions to Organizational Change, 16
LEADERSHIP Q. 529, 531 (2005).
51
TYLER & BLADER, supra note 50; David De Cremer & Tom R. Tyler, Managing Group
Behavior: The Interplay Between Procedural Justice, Sense of Self, and Cooperation, 37
ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 151, 191 (2005); David De Cremer et al., Manag47
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tions, promotes extra-role citizenship behavior, elevates job performance, increases levels of job satisfaction, and promotes acceptance of supervisor directives and company policies.52 When procedural justice is withheld, employees
often exit the workplace or refuse to cooperate with supervisors, and workplace
morale falls.53 Within procedurally unjust workplaces, employees exhibit
workplace stress and may engage in antisocial behavior. Taken together, this
research demonstrates that procedural justice powerfully affects the psychology
of how individuals think, feel, and behave in particular contexts and the dynamics of how groups, organizations, and societies interact.
Of marked significance, this psychological science reveals that procedural
justice is an important means of buttressing democratic norms and promoting
the legitimacy of democratic institutions. Experiences of procedural justice
shape the extent to which the public accepts law, legal decisions, and rules; and
the extent to which the public perceives legal authorities—including judges,
mediators, and courts—as legitimate.54 This wellspring of legitimacy shapes
the public’s willingness to obey legal rules and judicial decrees.55 Procedural
justice, hence, affords an avenue to both promote voluntary compliance with
law and encourage pro-social, civic, and democratic behavior.56 Insofar as procedural justice is so closely interwoven with human dignity, procedural justice
is both an end in itself and a vital means to promote the legitimacy of our civil
justice system.
B. Taboo Tradeoffs and the Problem of Constitutive Incommensurability
The article now turns to the phenomenon of taboo tradeoffs and the related
problem of constitutive incommensurability. These psychological phenomena
will be contrasted against the theory of unbounded decisionmaking, which theing Cooperation via Procedural Fairness: The Mediating Influence of Self-other Merging,
26 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 393, 401–02 (2005); David De Cremer & Tom R. Tyler, supra note
50, at 640.
52
See Virginia Murphy-Berman et al., Fairness and Health Care Decision Making: Testing
the Group Value Model of Procedural Justice, 12 SOC. JUST. RES. 117, 117 (1999); Kristina
Murphy & Tom Tyler, Procedural Justice and Compliance Behaviour: The Mediating Role
of Emotions, 38 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 652, 661 (2008).
53
Laurie J. Barclay et al., Exploring the Role of Emotions in Injustice Perceptions and Retaliation, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 629, 629 (2005); Ana Belén del Río-Lanza et al., Satisfaction with Service Recovery: Perceived Justice and Emotional Responses, 62 J. BUS. RES.
775, 776 (2009); David De Cremer, Unfair Treatment and Revenge Taking: The Roles of
Collective Identification and Feelings of Disappointment, 10 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY
RES. & PRAC. 220, 220 (2006).
54
Kristina Murphy et al., Nurturing Regulatory Compliance: Is Procedural Justice Effective
When People Question the Legitimacy of the Law?, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 17 (2009);
Tom R Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 375, 379–80 (2006).
55
Tyler, supra note 54, at 379.
56
LIND & TYLER, supra note 31, at 64; Donna Shestowsky, The Psychology of Procedural
Preference: How Litigants Evaluate Legal Procedures Ex Ante, 99 IOWA L. REV. 637, 642–
45 (2014).

Spring 2015]

PROCEDURAL JUSTICE TRADEOFFS

893

orizes that all competing values can be rendered commensurable and traded off
against each other. Chiefly, unbounded accounts of economic decisionmaking
theorize that people are indifferent to tradeoffs between competing values, so
long as any tradeoff yields the same amount of expected utility.
This classical account of unbounded decisionmaking depicts people as rational actors whose overriding aim is to increase their expected utility by selecting among utility-maximizing options from available choice sets.57 Under this
account, when people make decisions, they explicitly weigh and trade conflicting values against one another. Classically, indifference curves are used to
model and depict these tradeoffs. These indifference curves connect combinations of two different values, graphing points of equal utility and desirability
for two values along a smooth convex curve. Graphically, indifference curves
depict that for any two values, a change in the satisfaction of one value can be
compensated for by a change in the second value.58 Indifference reasoning is
taken as a prerequisite for unbounded economic rationality. That is, people are
theorized to first reduce and then explicitly weigh all conflicting preferences
and values according to a common utility metric.59
Over the past several decades, this classical depiction of unbounded decisionmaking has been revealed as incomplete by behavioral economists and researchers of social cognition.60 Instead, humans are “boundedly rational;”61
people have both difficulty with and resistance to translating all values into a
common utility metric.62 This difficulty is partially explained by the phenome-

57

See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 3 (3d
ed. 1972); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA: J. ECONOMETRIC SOC’Y 263, 263–64 (1979).
58
Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status
Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 196–97 (1991).
59
See Jonathan Baron, Tradeoffs Among Reasons for Action, 16 J. THEORY SOC. BEHAV.
173, 181 (1986); Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 292; McGraw et al., supra note 34, at
219; see also Robin S. Gregory, Incorporating Value Trade-offs into Community-Based Environmental Risk Decisions, 11 ENVTL. VALUES 461, 464–67 (2002).
60
Alan P. Fiske & Nick Haslam, Social Cognition Is Thinking About Relationships, 5
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 143, 143 (1996); Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on
Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 697, 702–03
(2003); Daniel J. Keys & Barry Schwartz, “Leaky” Rationality: How Research on Behavioral Decision Making Challenges Normative Standards of Rationality, 2 PERSP. PSYCHOL.
SCI. 162, 162 (2007); Tage Shakti Rai & Alan Page Fiske, Moral Psychology Is Relationship
Regulation: Moral Motives for Unity, Hierarchy, Equality, and Proportionality, 118
PSYCHOL. REV. 57, 57 (2011); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981).
61
See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 99
(1955); Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. SOC. 548, 553 (1981).
62
See Alon Harel & Ariel Porat, Commensurability and Agency: Two Yet-to-Be-Met Challenges for Law and Economics, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 749, 751–65 (2011); Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 854.

894

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:882

non of cognitive incommensurability.63 Mainly, people find it taxing and cognitively difficult to compare and contrast options across different metrics and dimensions, especially when they have neither personal experience nor cultural
standards to guide their judgment.64
Moreover, psychological science on moral decisionmaking has cast light
on how the public strikes difficult tradeoffs. For example, classical accounts of
unbounded rationality often either neglected or obscured the influence of ideologies, religious beliefs, moral values, and ethical positions on decisionmaking.
Over the past several decades, however, research on moral judgment and morally motivated decisionmaking has begun to illuminate these processes.65
Two lines of research within the field of moral psychology have examined
the phenomenon of taboo tradeoffs. First, Tetlock and colleagues have studied
how sacred values affect decisionmaking.66 These researchers define a sacred
value as a “value that a moral community implicitly or explicitly treats as possessing infinite or transcendental significance that precludes comparisons,
tradeoffs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or secular values.”67 In
the second line of research, Baron and colleagues have researched the effect of
protected values on decisionmaking, which they define as values “that resist
trade-offs with other values, particularly with economic values.”68 These experimental psychologists study forbidden tradeoffs by presenting members of the
63

See Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 62–63
(1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779,
795–76 (1994); see also John W. Patty, Incommensurability and Issue Voting, 19 J.
THEORETICAL POL. 115, 117 (2007); Jennifer K. Robbennolt et al., Symbolism and Incommensurability in Civil Sanctioning: Decision Makers as Goal Managers, 68 BROOK. L. REV.
1121, 1134–37 (2003); Arden Rowell, Partial Valuation in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 ADMIN.
L. REV. 723, 732 (2012) (arguing that commensurability should not be confused with monetizability).
64
See Martin Hanselmann & Carmen Tanner, Taboos and Conflicts in Decision Making:
Sacred Values, Decision Difficulty, and Emotions, 3 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 51, 58
(2008); Mary Frances Luce et al., Emotional Trade-Off Difficulty and Choice, 36 J.
MARKETING RES. 143, 143–47 (1999); McGraw et al., supra note 34, at 220–21; Patty, supra
note 63.
65
See generally SHAUN NICHOLS, SENTIMENTAL RULES: ON THE NATURAL FOUNDATIONS OF
MORAL JUDGMENT 4 (2004); JESSE J. PRINZ, THE EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF MORALS
(2007); Fiery Cushman et al., The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral
Judgment: Testing Three Principles of Harm, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1082, 1082 (2006); Joshua
Greene & Jonathan Haidt, How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?, 6 TRENDS
COGNITIVE SCI. 517, 517–23 (2002).
66
See Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 255; McGraw et al., supra note 34, at 221;
McGraw & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 4; Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 855–56.
67
See Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 853.
68
See Iliev et al., supra note 35, at 171; Jonathan Baron & Joshua Greene, Determinants of
Insensitivity to Quantity in Valuation of Public Goods: Contribution, Warm Glow, Budget
Constraints, Availability, and Prominence, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. APPLIED 107, 107
(1996); Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Omission Bias, Individual Differences, and Normality, 94 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 74, 74–78 (2004); Baron &
Spranca, supra note 35, at 1; Ritov & Baron, supra note 34, at 79.
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public with decisions that involve trading sacred/protected values for money.
When presented with these taboo tradeoffs, people experience sharp cognitive,
affective, and behavioral responses, including moral outrage.69
Research by Tetlock, Baron, and colleagues has demonstrated that taboo
tradeoffs, and the public’s marked resistance to translating all values into a
common utility metric, can be explained by the problem of constitutive incommensurability.70 A range of disciplines—including moral psychology, moral
philosophy, and sociology71—have grappled with the problem of constitutive
incommensurability. Constitutive incommensurability signifies that people
compartmentalize the kinds of tradeoffs that are considered legitimate. People,
for example, experience tradeoffs between goods and commodities that our society routinely subjects to market pricing as legitimate. In contrast, people experience other ends and values, such as loved ones, humanity, God, and justice,
as infinitely valuable and sacred, and hence the latter are not experienced as
fungible or commodifiable. Scholars working across disciplines have collected
illustrative taxonomies and frameworks for understanding blocked exchanges
(quintessential taboo tradeoffs), instances in which it is considered immoral to
monetize and sell. These blocked exchanges span to human beings, divine
grace, marriage, love, friendship, and sacred freedoms—including our freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion.72
Taboo tradeoffs emerge because we exist within a social and cultural environment that instills members with shared beliefs, values, norms, and commit-

69

See Iliev et al., supra note 35, at 170–71; Craig MacMillan & Colin Wastell, Taboo
Trade-offs, Moral Outrage and the Moral Limits of Markets, 2 MACQUARIE ECON. RES.
PAPERS 4 (2008).
70
See Jonathan Baron & Sarah Leshner, How Serious Are Expressions of Protected Values,
6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. APPLIED 183, 183 (2000); Gregory, supra note 59, at 466–67;
Hanselmann & Tanner, supra note 64, at 58–59; Keys & Schwartz, supra note 60, at 163–
65; Patty, supra note 63, at 118; see also Sunstein, supra note 63, at 795–812.
71
See Alan Page Fiske, Relativity Within Moose (“Mossi”) Culture: Four Incommensurable
Models for Social Relationships, 18 ETHOS 180, 194 (1990); MacMillan & Wastell, supra
note 69; Rai & Fiske, supra note 60; Nicola Righetti, The Sacred in Current Social Sciences
Research, 4 ITALIAN SOC. REV. 133, 145 (2014); Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 853–56; see
also JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 325, 325 n.1 (1986).
72
See Judith Andre, Blocked Exchanges: A Taxonomy, 103 ETHICS 29–47 (1992); see also
Philip E. Tetlock et al., Proscribed Forms of Social Cognition: Taboo Trade-offs, Blocked
Exchanges, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals, in RELATIONAL MODELS
THEORY: A CONTEMPORARY OVERVIEW 247, 247–61 (Nick Haslam ed., 2004); MICHAEL
WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 100–01 (1983).
[T]he initial agreement on the principle of equal liberty is final. An individual recognizing religious and moral obligations regards them as binding absolutely in the sense that he cannot qualify his fulfillment of them for the sake of greater means for promoting his other interests. Greater
economic and social benefits are not a sufficient reason for accepting less than an equal liberty.
It seems possible to consent to an unequal liberty only if there is a threat of coercion.

JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 207 (1971)
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ments.73 These shared beliefs, values, norms, and commitments require that
members of society deny comparison and commodification of certain concepts.74 Members of society are socialized to reject tradeoffs between things of
finite monetary value with ends and values that our society deems of transcendental and infinite significance.75 Striking a taboo tradeoff, such as by attaching
monetary value when, say, selling one’s child, is to disqualify oneself from society.76 In sum, a taboo tradeoff exists when monetizing subverts an end or value that society deems infinitely meaningful. This forbidden tradeoff is itself experienced as morally corrosive, or taboo.77

73
See Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Identity, Morals, and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets, 126
Q.J. ECON. 805, 807–08 (2011); Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 854–55; Tetlock et al., supra
note 72. Emile Durkheim reasoned about similar societal phenomena:

There can be no society, which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas which make its unity and its personality.
. . . Now this moral remaking cannot be achieved except by the means of reunions, assemblies,
and meetings where the individuals being closely united to one another, reaffirm in common
their common sentiments.

EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE 427 (Karen E. Fields trans.,
1995).
74
See Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 73, at 811; Luce et al., supra note 64, at 143–47.
75
See Baron, supra note 59, at 182; Baron & Spranca, supra note 35, at 3; Hanselmann &
Tanner, supra note 64, at 52; Sarah Lichtenstein et al., What’s Bad Is Easy: Taboo Values,
Affect, and Cognition, 2 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 169, 170 (2007); MacMillan &
Wastell, supra note 69, at 3–4; McGraw & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 4; Tetlock et al., supra
note 33, at 854.
76
See Philip E. Tetlock, Social Functionalist Frameworks for Judgment and Choice: Intuitive Politicians, Theologians, and Prosecutors, 109 PSYCHOL. REV. 451, 459 (2002); Tetlock
et al., supra note 33, at 854; see also RAZ, supra note 71, at 346 (“For such parents, having
children and having money cannot be compared in value. Moreover, they will be indignant at
the suggestion that such a comparison is possible. Finally, they will refuse to contemplate
even the possibility of such an exchange.”).
77
See Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 73, at 812; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 285–91;
McGraw et al., supra note 34, at 221; Rai & Fiske, supra note 60, at 66; Tetlock et al., supra
note 33, at 867. Though psychological research on taboo tradeoffs had been conducted in the
last several decades, humans have experienced and written about such conundrums since the
days of Greek antiquity. For example, in the Phoenician Maidens, Euripides accentuates the
plot by drawing both on taboo tradeoffs and tragic tradeoffs. EURIPIDES, THE P LAYS OF
EURIPIDES: VOLUME I, at 235, 248 (Edward P. Coleridge trans., 1891). There, Jocasta, mother
to her dueling regal sons, Polynices and Eteocles, who battle for the throne of Thebes, puts
to Eteocles a taboo tradeoff: “Riches make no settled home, but are as transient as the day.
Come, suppose I put before thee two alternatives, whether thou wilt rule or save thy city?
Wilt thou say ‘Rule’? . . . thou wilt see this city conquered . . . so will that wealth thou art so
bent on getting become a grievous bane to Thebes; but still ambition fills thee.” Id. at 235.
Eteocles who chooses unwisely perishes, teaching the immorality of his choice. Later in the
play, Teiresias, the seer, puts to Creon a tragic tradeoff, “Choose thee one of these alternatives; either save the city or thy son.” Id. at 248. Creon’s beloved son is sacrificed, and
Thebes survives.
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C. Relational Theory and the Sacred-Value-Protection Model
Relational theory posits when, and under what circumstances, people will
likely experience taboo tradeoffs;78 whereas the sacred-value-protection
(“SVP”) model theorizes the psychological consequences that people experience when confronting taboo tradeoffs.79
First, relational theory reveals that people will likely view a tradeoff as impermissible when that tradeoff requires appraisal of a concept governed by one
relational model using a different relational model.80 Relational theory posits
that there are four models that generate or lend normative force to our social
relationships.81 Within the social and cultural domains in which each of these
four models operate, people can and often do make tradeoffs without cognitive
or emotional difficulty.82 Yet when people are forced to make comparisons that
cross these disparate models, they experience cognitive discomfort, anxiety,
and in some cases moral outrage.83 Relational theory predicts that people will
experience the most discomfort when attempting to monetize a concept governed by the communal-sharing model using a market-pricing scheme. The latter comparison is experienced as corrosive—felt and thought of as morally taboo.84
According to relational theory, humans harness four discrete models to
make comparisons.85 Society at large, and localized cultures, instill members
with beliefs about when these models apply, as well as to what, and to whom.
In the main, people within a given society and culture share an implicit consensus about when and how to implement the following four models: communal-sharing, authority-ranking, equality-matching, and market pricing.86 The
communal-sharing model divides the world into distinct equivalence classes,
permitting differentiation or contrast, but without numerical comparison.87 That
is, all members of a community may share communal benefits and resources
78

See Alan P. Fiske, The Four Elementary Forms of Sociality: Framework for a Unified
Theory of Social Relations, 99 PSYCHOL. REV. 689, 689–93 (1992); Fiske & Tetlock, supra
note 34, at 258–65; McGraw & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 2–4.
79
See Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 285–91; Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 853–60.
80
See Fiske, supra note 78, at 711–15; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 255–65.
81
See Fiske, supra note 78, at 689–93; Fiske & Haslam, supra note 60, at 144–45; McGraw
et al., supra note 34, at 220; Tetlock, supra note 76, at 458–59.
82
See Fiske, supra note 78, at 689–93; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 265–66.
83
See Fiske, supra note 78, at 711–15; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 273–81; McGraw
& Tetlock, supra note 34, at 2–12.
84
See Fiske, supra note 78, at 711–15; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 276–77; McGraw
& Tetlock, supra note 34, at 3–8.
85
See Fiske, supra note 78, at 689–93; Fiske & Haslam, supra note 60, at 144–45; Fiske &
Tetlock, supra note 34, at 258–60; McGraw et al., supra note 34, at 220; Tetlock, supra note
76, at 458–59.
86
See Fiske, supra note 78, at 689–93; Fiske & Haslam, supra note 60, at 146; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 260–61; McGraw & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 2–3.
87
See Fiske, supra note 78, at 702–06; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 258; McGraw &
Tetlock, supra note 34, at 3.
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without differentiation, including municipal parks, clean air, and national defense. In the context of a communal-sharing relationship, people pool and share
resources, which they treat as belonging to a larger whole that transcends individual members.88 In contrast, the authority-ranking model signifies ordinal or
hierarchical ranking among persons or social goods.89 Thus, veterans may be
given priority access to governmental jobs, and within the military, scarce benefits and resources may be doled based on rank. Another example includes hierarchy, in many traditional societies, based upon familial relations across generations. The third domain is equality matching.90 This relational structure
defines socially meaningful intervals that can be added or subtracted. For example, if one’s neighbor offers to help another neighbor, then the expectation in
return is that the latter neighbor will reciprocate when assistance is needed, a
classic tit-for-tat structure. Other examples include tit-for-tat structures in cooperatives and other social organizations. The final domain is market pricing.91
People make decisions, using market pricing, that combine quantities of goods
and entities into a common utility metric. For example, people often use market
pricing to compare and contrast different goods and services using the ratio of
quality/price or for hourly wages. The quintessential example includes market
transactions between buyers and sellers.
Relational theory posits that people will experience angst and constitutive
incommensurability when forced to make tradeoffs between entities belonging
to two different relational models.92 When two or more entities fall within the
same relational domain, they are constitutively comparable. People, however,
experience anxiety, discomfort, and cognitive distress when decisions require
explicit weighing of choices among entities governed by different relational
models.93 Further, the theory predicts that the intensity of distress depends on
the direction and distance between the two models. Relational theory sets forth
a continuum from left to right: from community-sharing, authority-ranking, and
88

See Fiske, supra note 78, at 693–700.
See Fiske, supra note 78, at 700–02; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 258; McGraw &
Tetlock, supra note 34, at 3.
90
See Fiske, supra note 78, at 693–700; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 258; McGraw &
Tetlock, supra note 34, at 3.
91
See Fiske, supra note 78, at 706–08; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 258; McGraw &
Tetlock, supra note 34, at 3.
92
See Fiske, supra note 78, at 711–15; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 258–60; McGraw
& Tetlock, supra note 34, at 3–4. Here too, Emile Durkheim eloquently discussed this human experience,
89

Since the idea of the sacred is always and everywhere separated from the idea of the profane in
the thought of men, and since we picture a sort of logical chasm between the two, the mind irresistibly refuses to allow the two corresponding things to be confounded, or even to be merely put
in contact with each other; for such a promiscuity, or even too direct a contiguity, would contradict too violently the dissociation of these ideas in the mind. The sacred thing is par excellence
that which the profane should not touch, and cannot touch with impunity.

DURKHEIM, supra note 73, at 38.
93
See Fiske, supra note 78, at 711–15; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 273–81; McGraw
& Tetlock, supra note 34, at 3–8.
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equality-matching to market pricing. Crossing models from left to right on this
continuum, especially when one engages in a comparison of a concept falling
within the communal-sharing model using a market-pricing scheme, generates
sharp distress. This theory predicts that people will likely experience a tradeoff
as taboo when that tradeoff requires market pricing to compare, monetize, and
exchange a concept that society regards as intrinsically shared by all within the
community.
While relational theory illuminates when, and under what conditions, people will experience taboo tradeoffs, the sacred-value-protection model theorizes
psychological consequences including how people will respond to taboo
tradeoffs.94 Psychological science has demonstrated that, when observers believe that decisionmakers have struck a taboo tradeoff, observers respond with
moral outrage.95 The research has also revealed that, after contemplating a taboo tradeoff, decisionmakers often engage in moral cleansing.96
Turning first to observers, the SVP model predicts that, when observers believe decisionmakers have entertained a proscribed tradeoff, they will respond
with moral outrage.97 This outrage may take cognitive, affective, and behavioral forms. For example, observers may respond with harsh dispositional attributions toward the decisionmakers, as well as with anger, contempt, and perhaps
disgust.98 Observers may respond with rage and attempt to enforce norms that
protect sacred values, perhaps by punishing those who breached normative
boundaries. Moreover, research on the SVP model has revealed that the longer
observers believe that decisionmakers have contemplated comparing sacred
values, the greater their moral outrage.99
Turning next to the decisionmakers themselves, the SVP model predicts
that even decisionmakers will feel tainted by contemplating a taboo tradeoff.100
After the fact, decisionmakers may engage in symbolic acts of moral cleansing
94

See Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 278–81; McGraw & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 3–
4; Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 855–56.
95
This research has revealed several moderators that amplify and attenuate this moral outrage and moral cleansing effect. For example, there are domain moderators—the greater the
psychometric distance between the domains, the greater the outrage. The most elevated outrage is reserved for transgressing the community sharing with market pricing models. Moreover, there are, at times, ideological moderators. Particular ideological groups and subcultures may experience tradeoffs as more taboo than others. A capitalist—libertarian, for
example, may see fit to reduce many communal phenomenon into market-pricing terms,
whereas a social—Democrat would not. As well, there may be contextual moderators. It may
be possible to amplify or attenuate outrage depending on the degree to which a tradeoff is
directed at and threatens a core socio-political belief.
96
See Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 855–56.
97
See Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 285–88; Tetlock, supra note 76, at 453–61; Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 855–56.
98
See generally Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 285–88.
99
See Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 285–88; Tetlock, supra note 76, at 458–59; Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 855–56.
100
See Tetlock, supra note 76, at 458–59; Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 855–56.

900

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:882

to reaffirm their membership in and solidarity with the moral community.101
Indeed, research has revealed that merely considering or contemplating the forbidden tradeoff may make a decisionmaker feel contaminated—and the longer
the contemplation, the greater the contamination.102
II. AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF TABOO PROCEDURAL TRADEOFFS
A. Method
In this program of research, we experimentally investigate how the public
makes tradeoffs between procedural justice versus the cost of legal process.
First, are people willing to pay to upgrade from unfair to fair process, when required to pay a small, medium, or large fee? If so, what is the public’s maximum willingness to pay to ascend from unfair to fair process? Second, and
conversely, are people willing to accept a small, medium, or large payment to
downgrade from fair to unfair process? If so, what is the public’s minimum
willingness to accept to descend from procedural justice to procedural injustice? The latter question raises the conundrums described above, mainly the
problem of constitutive incommensurability and taboo tradeoffs. Finally, do
these willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept values vary with the underlying interests at stake? To investigate these questions, we conducted an experiment with a broadly representative sample of the American public.
1. Describing the Study
In this empirical legal study, we presented members of the American public with vignettes that involved legal disputes. Participants were presented with
three different kinds of disputes: child custody, employment, and apartment
rental disputes.
In the child custody dispute, members of the public were placed in the role
of a spouse, married for over ten years, worked full-time, and cared equally
with their partner for two children. Over time, when conflicts began to escalate
within the marriage, they attempted a trial separation. During that trial separation, they moved out of the home and into a nearby apartment but continued to
spend equal time with the children. Their spouse ultimately filed for divorce
and sought primary physical custody of the children. While they agreed on the
divorce, they wished to challenge their spouse’s position on custody.
In the employment dispute, participants were placed in the role of an employee who worked for a company for many years. One day, they began working with a coworker and noticed that the coworker stole several hundred dollars
from a cash drawer. They confronted their coworker about it and demanded
that their coworker return the funds, but they did not bring his conduct to the
attention of their supervisor. About one month later, with little notice or explanation, they were fired. The only reason given was that they behaved inappro101
102

See Tetlock, supra note 76, at 458–59.
See Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 855–60; Tetlock, supra note 76, at 458–59.
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priately. They decided to challenge the decision by filing a grievance with the
company’s human resources department, which has given them a chance to appeal the decision.
Last, in the apartment rental dispute, members of the public were placed in
the position of a renter who signed a two-year apartment lease. One of the provisions of the lease restricted them from having overnight guests. At the time of
signing, they did not think much of the provision and believed that they would
be able to follow it. However, their mother became desperately ill and needed
someone to care for her. They volunteered to allow her to come and stay at
their apartment until she returned to full health. They had forgotten about the
provision of the lease, but a neighbor became aware of their mother’s stay and
told their landlord. They then received an eviction notice for violating the lease
but decided to challenge the eviction by bringing a complaint to the local landlord-tenant official.
To conduct this experiment, a nationally representative sample of the
American public was recruited, using Amazon Mechanical Turk.103 Amazon
Mechanical Turk is widely employed in the behavioral and social sciences as a
platform to recruit nationally representative samples of online participants.104
The experiment was a 2 x 4 between-subject design.105 Each participant was
randomly assigned into one condition where they, in turn, reviewed all three
vignettes consistent with that condition. Using Qualtrics, the 400 online participants106 were assigned to one of the eight conditions depicted in Table 1.
The first factor manipulated whether participants began with fair process
versus unfair process. To manipulate whether participants began with fair process or not, we drew on concepts theorized in the literature to affect perceptions
of procedural justice, mainly whether participants were provided a voice and
opportunity to be heard, a neutral and trustworthy decisionmaker, and treated
103

The website can be accessed at http://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome.
See generally Gabriele Paolacci et al., Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical
Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411, 411–19 (2010); see also Krista Casler et al.,
Separate but Equal? A Comparison of Participants and Data Gathered via Amazon’s
MTurk, Social Media, and Face-to-Face Behavioral Testing, 29 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV.
2156, 2156–60 (2013); Rick M. Gardner et al., Using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk Website to
Measure Accuracy of Body Size Estimation and Body Dissatisfaction, 9 BODY IMAGE 532,
532–34 (2012); John J. Horton et al., The Online Laboratory: Conducting Experiments in a
Real Labor Market, 14 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 399, 401–06 (2011); Winter Mason & Siddharth Suri, Conducting Behavioral Research on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, 44 BEHAV.
RES. METHODS 1, 1–23 (2011).
105
For literature discussing between-subject designs, see SHERRI L. JACKSON, RESEARCH
METHODS AND STATISTICS A CRITICAL THINKING APPROACH 152–62 (2003); S. Alexander
Haslam & Craig McGarty, Experimental Design and Causality in Social Psychological Research, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF METHODS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 237, 245 (Carol Sansone et al. eds., 2004); Eliot R. Smith, Research Design, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH
METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 27 (Harry T. Reis & Charles M. Judd
eds., 2000).
106
Demographic information about the sample is provided in Appendix 1, in the online supplement to this article at http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nlj/vol15/iss2/18/.
104
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TABLE 1: 2 X 4 BETWEEN-SUBJECT DESIGN
Factor A: WTP vs. WTA

Small

Asked Max WTP to Upgrade to Fair Asked Min WTA to Downgrade to UnProcess & Prompt Suggested Small fair Process & Prompt Suggested Small
Fee
Payment

Medium

Asked Max WTP to Upgrade to Fair Asked Min WTA to Downgrade to UnProcess & Prompt Suggested Medi- fair Process & Prompt Suggested Medium Fee
um Payment

Large

WTA: Began with Fair Process,
Receives Payment for Downgrade

Asked Max WTP to Upgrade to Fair Asked Min WTA to Downgrade to UnProcess & Prompt Suggested Large fair Process & Prompt Suggested Large
Fee
Payment

Unspecified

Factor B: Size of Fee or Payment Suggested

WTP: Began with Unfair Process,
Required to Pay Fee to Upgrade

Asked Max WTP to Upgrade to Fair Asked Min WTA to Downgrade to UnProcess
fair Process

with dignity and respect.107 In the first level of this factor, participants began
with unfair process and were then asked their willingness to pay to upgrade to a
fair process with these features. That is, participants started in a condition that
lacked procedural justice and were asked their maximum willingness to pay to
upgrade to a condition in which procedural justice was present. In the second
level of this factor, participants began with fair process and were asked their
minimum willingness to accept to downgrade to unfair process. Here, participants began in a condition in which procedural justice was present, and then
they were asked the minimum they would be willing to accept trade down to
unfair procedures lacking procedural justice.
In further detail, manipulation of this first factor began participants with a
default procedure (Procedure A) that either withheld or afforded participants
procedural justice. In the willingness-to-pay (“WTP”) condition for the child
custody dispute vignette, for example, Procedure A withheld procedural justice
from participants:
The court will allow you to appear before a judge who will not allow you to explain why you should be awarded custody. The judge will be neither polite nor
respectful in response to your complaint. The judge will not use objective criteria when deciding how to award custody and will be biased when making a decision. The judge will be untrustworthy.

Participants were informed that Procedure A was the default option provided to them at no cost. Participants were then ultimately asked about any prefer107

For the discussion of procedural justice, see supra Part I.A.
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ence for, and their maximum willingness to pay for, Procedure B, described as
follows:
The court will allow you to appear before a judge who will allow you to explain
why you should be awarded custody. The judge will be polite and respectful
during the hearing. The judge will use objective criteria in deciding how to
award custody and will be unbiased when making a decision. Procedure B will
require that you pay a [small/moderate/large/] fee.

In contrast, in the WTA condition for the child custody dispute vignette,
participants began with the following default procedure:
The court will allow you to appear before a judge who will allow you to explain
why you should be awarded custody. The judge will be polite and respectful
during the hearing. The judge will use objective criteria in deciding how to
award custody and will be unbiased when making a decision. The judge will be
trustworthy. Procedure A is the default option and is provided to you at no cost.

Participants were then asked about any preference for, and their minimum
willingness to accept payment for, Procedure B:
The court will allow you to appear before a judge who will not allow you to explain why you should be awarded custody. The judge will be neither polite nor
respectful in response to your complaint. The judge will not use objective criteria when deciding how to award custody and will be biased when making a decision. The judge will be untrustworthy. If you select Procedure B, the court will
pay you a [small/moderate/large/] fee.

As shown above, the second factor was a subtle manipulation of the suggested size of the fee to be paid or payment to be received. In the WTP condition, the prompt in the last line of Procedure B suggested that participants
would be required to pay a small, medium, or large fee for Procedure B, or left
unspecified the nature of that fee. Conversely, in the WTA condition, the
prompt in the last line describing Procedure B suggested that participants
would receive a small, moderate, or large payment, or left unspecified the nature of that payment.
2. Forced-Choice Paradigm
The first dependent variable of interest was the public’s procedural preference. To measure these preferences, we harnessed a forced-choice paradigm.
We asked participants to choose one of the two procedural options presented,
either Procedure A or Procedure B. In the WTP condition, Procedure A was the
default and entailed unfair process, whereas Procedure B entailed fair process.
In the WTA condition, Procedure A was the default and entailed fair process,
whereas Procedure B entailed unfair process.108

108

For another excellent study of procedural justice that conducts a forced-choice paradigm
between voice and cost, see Avital Mentovich et al., My Life for a Voice: The Influence of
Voice on Health-Care Decisions, 27 SOC. JUST. RES. 99 (2014).
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3. Willingness-to-Pay and Willingness-to-Accept Framework

The primary dependent variable of interest was the public’s willingness-topay (“WTP”) and willingness-to-accept (“WTA”). This dependent variable—
WTP and WTA—is widely used in related fields of social science inquiry. For
example, these measures are harnessed within the field of behavioral economics to examine prospect theory and endowment effects.109 Moreover, these
measures have been used within the fields of social and moral psychology to
examine the existence of taboo tradeoffs and tensions between sacred and secular values. This literature suggests that when WTP is roughly equivalent to
WTA, there is no endowment effect—the allocation of the initial thing, be it a
good, property, value, or process, does not affect whether someone is willing to
part with it at a higher rate. When WTA value is significantly above WTP,
however, an endowment effect has emerged. Classically, the endowment effect
has ranged within a band of WTA two to five times greater than WTP.
B. Results
1. Forced-Choice Paradigm
The forced-choice paradigm investigated the following questions: First, are
people willing to upgrade from unfair to fair procedures, even when required to
pay a small, moderate, or large fee? That is, when forced to do so, are people
willing to purchase fair procedures? Second, are people willing to accept payments to downgrade from fair to unfair procedures, such as when offered a
small, moderate, or large payment? The latter question, put bluntly, investigates
whether people are willing to sell and exchange the procedural-justice guarantees conferred to them.
Results of the analysis are presented in Table 2 and Figure 1 below:
TABLE 2 - PERCENTAGES OF THE PUBLIC WHO CHOOSE
FAIR PROCESS ACROSS ALL DISPUTES
Small Fee /
Payment

Moderate Fee /
Payment

Large Fee /
Payment

WTP Condition;
Default = Unfair Process

99.5%
(CI = 96.3–99.9)

95.6%
(CI = 91.4–97.8)

91.8%
(CI = 86.7–95.1)

WTA Condition;
Default = Fair Process

98.3%
(CI = 93.6–99.6)

94.8%
(CI = 89.5–97.5)

85.9%
(CI = 77.5–91.4)

Turning first to the WTP condition, the public began with unfair process
and was required to pay a fee to upgrade from unfair to fair process. Here,
overwhelmingly, the public was willing to pay to upgrade to fair procedures
109

See generally John K. Horowitz & Kenneth E. McConnell, A Review of WTA/WTP Studies, 44 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 426 (2002); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of
the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990). For sources
cited in the discussion of the endowment effect and prospect theory, see infra Part II.C.
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across each of the three scenarios. On average, 97.3 percent (CI = 94.5–98.6
percent) of the public was willing to pay for procedural justice across each of
the three scenarios (respectively, small fee = 99.47 percent, moderate fee =
95.57 percent, and large fee = 91.8 percent). In the WTP condition, the public
began with a default of unfair process but ultimately preferred fair process and
was willing to pay small, moderate, and large fees to enhance procedural justice.
FIGURE 1: THE PUBLIC’S ROBUST PREFERENCE FOR PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

In marked contrast, in the WTA condition, the public began with a default
of fair process and was approached with the prospect of a payment to downgrade to unfair process. That is, the public was asked, in effect, to sell the procedural justice initially granted to them. Overwhelmingly, the public rejected
the exchange across all three scenarios. On average, 94.9 percent (CI = 91.4–
97.0 percent) of the public rejected the payment and remained with fair process
across each of the three scenarios110 (respective, small payment = 98.3 percent,
medium payment = 94.8 percent, and large payment = 85.9 percent). In the
WTA condition, the public began with a default of fair process and was unwilling to part with fair process irrespective of the size of the fee signaled by the
prompt; the public was unwilling to exchange procedural justice for money.

110

Results of the forced-choice paradigm for each scenario are presented in Appendix 2, in
the online supplement to this article at http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nlj/vol15/iss2/18/. See
supra Part II.D.
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After participants selected their procedure, we allowed them to explain
their decisions in free-entry responses. Across these disputes, most members of
the public explained that they would be willing to pay to ensure that they receive procedural justice. For example, in the employment dispute, a participant
explained that she chose procedural justice because, “My job is very important
to me. I want someone to evaluate the decision fairly and without bias. Having
someone evaluate my case who is trustworthy and willing to hear my side is
critical.” Another stated that she wanted “the HR department to be fair and
honest. I want to be able to explain my side. It is better to pay to receive justice,
than to experience injustice for free.” In the child-custody dispute, one participant stated, “Even though it’s going to be more expensive, I need to know that
the person who is deciding a significant issue in my life will treat me and my
case with dignity and serve my family with the time and care that we deserve.”
Another indicated her anger over having to pay for basic justice but stated,
“Even though I am distressed about having to pay a large fee, I feel it is worth
it in order to get a just and fair judge who will listen to my case objectively and
give me a shot at custody of my children. It’s too important a decision to risk in
the hands of a judge who would not be objective.”
In contrast, many participants expressed anger at the proposal of monetizing and selling fair procedural justice. For example, in the employment scenario, a participant stated, “I think I deserve the opportunity to explain myself.
Money seems to have been the issue in the first place and I will not allow it to
continue the problem. Money is not worth my self-image and the value of my
character. I know I have done little to nothing wrong and no amount of money
will allow me to change that opinion.” Another stated, “I would rather be heard
than paid to be mistreated.” In the child custody dispute, a participant stated, “I
want things to be fair, no amount of money would make me want to take the
risk I could lose custody of my kids because I took a pay off instead of asking
for the fairest hearing.” Another stated, “No amount of money would make it
okay for me not have a chance to explain why I should have custody of the children.”
2. Willingness-to-Pay and Willingness-to-Accept Measures
Moreover, the WTP-WTA measures investigated the following questions:
First, if the public is willing to pay to upgrade from unfair to fair procedures,
what is the public’s maximum willingness to pay for fair procedures? Second,
if the public is willing to sell fair procedures, and to thereby downgrade from
fair to unfair procedures, what is the public’s minimum willingness to accept?
Finally, do these WTP-WTA values vary depending on the underlying interests
at stake?
We collapsed across conditions on this factor to create composite means
for the maximum willingness-to-pay and minimum willingness-to-accept con-
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ditions.111 The composite means for each of the scenarios are presented below.
We first discuss the WTP condition, then the WTA condition, and last the full
range of the data.
a. Maximum Willingness-to-Pay Procedural Justice
In the WTP condition, participants began with a default of unfair process
and were ultimately asked the maximum they would be willing to pay to upgrade to fair process. Figure 2 displays the composite means for WTP for each
of the three vignettes. The mean willingness to pay to upgrade to fair process
across all vignettes was $1,646 (CI = $1,159–$2,133). Drilling down to each
scenario, the average willingness to pay to upgrade to fair procedures in the
apartment rental dispute was $329 (CI = $266–$393) and in the employment
dispute was $451 (CI = $343–$560), whereas the average WTP in the child
custody dispute was $4,157 (CI = $2,751–$5,563).
FIGURE 2: WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (IN DOLLARS)

111

See
Appendix
3
in
the
online
supplement
to
this
article
at
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nlj/vol15/iss2/18/. Given that the monetary WTP/WTA values
were highly skewed, we first conducted a log transformation of the monetary values to perform statistical analyses, see BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING
MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS 81, 308 (Allyn & Bacon eds., 2011). We then observed in the
WTP conditions, but not the WTA conditions, a small effect relating to the factor that manipulated the subtle prompt suggesting the size of payment, Factor A (F(2,176) = 6.1, p =
0.003) and the interaction of Factor A with Scenario (F(4,352) = 2.7, p = 0.031). Even so,
the effect of the kind of Scenario (i.e., apartment rental, employment, versus child custody
dispute) was vastly larger (F(2,352) = 229.11, p < 0.001). Therefore, for purposes of the
WTP analyses presented below, see infra note 99, Factor A and its interaction with Scenario
were included as covariates in the linear-mixed-effects model.
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We performed a repeated-measure ANOVA to examine whether the different underlying values at stake—child custody, employment rehiring, or apartment rental—affected the public’s willingness-to-pay for fair process.112 As
starkly illustrated, people were willing to pay a great deal more in the child custody dispute than in the apartment rental or employment condition.
Importantly, in the WTP condition, the vast majority of participants (80
percent) were willing to pay for fair process in all three of the scenarios (that is,
80 percent were willing to pay for fair process in three of three scenarios). Even
so, a fraction (12.8 percent) of participants rejected the very idea of paying for
fair process in at least one of the three scenarios. These participants rejected our
instruction to designate the maximum they would pay for fair process. In their
free-entry written responses at the end of our survey, these participants expressed that fair process was a human right, one that they should not be required to pay for.
b. Minimum Willingness-to-Accept Procedural Injustice
In the WTA condition, participants began with fair process as the default
and were asked the minimum that they would be willing to accept to sell fair
process and downgrade to unfair process. Figure 3 displays the composite
WTA means for each of the three vignettes. While the same pattern emerges as
in Figure 2, the scales of the graphs presented for WTP and WTA differ markedly, a matter to which we will return. The mean willingness to accept to descend from procedural justice to procedural injustice across all vignettes was
$487,109 (CI = $331,023–$643,196). Examining each scenario individually,
the average willingness to accept to downgrade to procedural injustice in the
apartment rental was $98,836 (CI = $26,041–$171,633); while the average
WTA for the employment dispute was $160,806 (CI = $25,173–$296,441);
whereas the average WTA in the child custody dispute was $1,201,685 (CI =
$778,648–$1,624,722).
Here again, we performed a repeated-measure ANOVA,113 to examine
whether the different underlying values at stake affected the American public’s
112

A linear-mixed-effects model was fit in SPSS with Scenario, Factor A, and their interaction as fixed effects and participant as a random effect. See generally BRADY T. WEST ET AL.,
LINEAR MIXED MODELS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE USING STATISTICAL SOFTWARE (2006). There
were significant differences in WTP between scenarios (F(2,352) = 229.1, p < 0.001). Specifically, the amount participants were WTP in the child custody scenario was significantly
greater than either the employment (t(352) = 17.8, p < 0.001) or apartment scenarios (t(352)
= 19.2, p < 0.001). There was no significant difference in the amount participants were WTP
between the apartment and employment scenarios (t(352) = 1.4, p = 0.411). As we discuss
infra, this supports the theory that WTP-WTA values vary depending on context and the
human interests at stake.
113
A linear-mixed-effects model was fit in SPSS with Scenario as a fixed effect and participant as a random effect. There were significant differences in WTA between Scenarios
(F(2,234) = 97.8 p < 0.001). Specifically, the amount participants were WTA in the child
custody dispute scenario was significantly greater than either the employment (t(234) = 9.3,
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minimum willingness to accept. In the child custody dispute, the minimum that
people were willing to accept to sell fair process, and to thereby descend from
procedural justice to injustice, eclipsed the WTA for the other scenarios.
FIGURE 3: WILLINGNESS-TO-ACCEPT PROCEDURAL INJUSTICE (IN DOLLARS)

Of note, while 60 percent of participants complied with our instruction to
list their minimum willingness-to-accept value across all three scenarios, approximately 40 percent of participants rejected this instruction and refused to
list a minimum willingness-to-accept value to downgrade to unfair process in at
least one of three scenarios—primarily the child custody scenario—or they
listed an astronomical sum, eclipsing hundreds of millions of dollars.114 That is,
many participants were unwilling to sell procedural justice and to accept, in essence, any amount of money to downgrade to procedural injustice. In free-entry
written responses to our study, these participants explained that they felt selling
procedural justice was immoral, that the experiment had asked them to engage
in a forbidden exchange. In the employment dispute, for example, a participant
stated, Procedure A “is fair and lets you air what you have to and they listen to
you. Procedure B is biased and unfair . . . . No amount of money can replace an
unbiased hearing. No matter what the outcome is.” In the child custody dispute,
p < 0.001) or apartment scenarios (t(234) = 13.6, p < 0.001). Participants’ WTA was greater
in the employment scenario than in the apartment scenario (t(234) = 4.3, p < 0.001).
114
For example, these participants listed a minimum willingness-to-accept exceeding one
billion dollars. Such participants were excluded for purposes of the statistical analyses and
treated like those participants who refused to monetize fair process when deriving the
WTP/WTA values presented below. Several participants explained in free-entry responses
why they selected such astronomical WTA values, “I chose a huge amount of money because I feel that there is not an amount of money for me to choose Procedure B [procedural
injustice] for all of the situations presented in the study.”
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a participant wrote, “Procedure A is clearly the better option. This is the fair
and just option and the only reason I can think of a person rather having Procedure B is so they can gain financially and to me it is unthinkable that a person would choose to receive a payment from the court over a fair procedure in
determining the custody of their children.” Another stated, “No amount of money would compare to having an unbiased judge in a situation like this. I would
choose A no matter how much money I was paid.”
c.

Taboo Procedural Tradeoffs in Context
FIGURE 4: TABOO PROCEDURAL TRADEOFFS IN CONTEXT
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We depict the mean willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept values in
the same graph in Figure 4. Figure 4 exhibits both the vast difference between
these WTP-WTA values and the extent to which these values vary with the underlying interests at stake. The bottom panel presents the full range of WTP
values on an axis that rises to $6,000, whereas the top panel presents the full
range of WTA values on an axis that rises to $1,750,000. The top panel presents a range displaying the entire data set. As can easily be seen, the mean
WTA values for all scenarios eclipse the axis presented in the bottom panel.
With regard to Figure 4, several observations are in order. First, the lay
public’s minimum willingness to accept to sell procedural justice, and to thereby downgrade to procedural injustice, is exponentially higher than the amount
they would be willing to pay to upgrade the status quo to fair process. Indeed,
when compared to the public’s willingness-to-pay, the public’s willingness-toaccept values are behemoth. That is, the public has great difficulty monetizing
procedural justice in market-price terms and selling procedural justice. Consistent with the social-psychological literature on taboo tradeoffs and relational
theory, it appears that procedural justice is a sacred/protected value in our society and culture. Members of the public were either unwilling to monetize and
sell procedural fairness (again, 40 percent of participants were unwilling to do
so in at least one of the three scenarios) and, if they were so willing, the WTA
value exponentially escalated far beyond—eclipsed—the WTP value.
Second, the underlying interests at stake mattered a great deal. The child
custody context appears to present participants with a double taboo tradeoff. By
selling fair process, participants not only lose the opportunity to be heard before a neutral decisionmaker who will treat them with dignity and respect, but
they may ultimately lose their children. Thus, participants felt that the conundrum asked them to monetize both procedural justice and the significance of
bonds with their children.115
Third, interestingly, the standard deviations around the WTP terms were
tighter than the standard deviations around the WTA terms. While members of
the public appear to have a rough sense of what they would be willing to pay to
enhance procedural fairness, people have great difficulty converging on an
amount for which they would be willing to sell, and thereby abandon, procedural fairness. This lends support to the hypothesis of constitutive incommensurability. In this regard, several participants noted the difficulty of monetizing
procedural justice: “It was really difficult to put a price on changing options for
the custody hearing, I can’t really think about putting a price on something invaluable like that.” Within our society and culture, people do not often explicitly and with self-awareness monetize and sell the basic justice bestowed to
them. Therefore, the WTA value is not only much higher than the WTP value,
115
Cf. RAZ, supra note 71, at 346–48 (“Moreover, they will be indignant at the suggestion
that such a comparison is possible. Finally, they will refuse to contemplate even the possibility of such an exchange.”).
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but the standard-deviation bands are much wider, revealing that the public had
difficulty converging on a monetary range thought normative.
C. Discussion
We hypothesized that, consistent with social-psychological research on taboo tradeoffs and relational theory, while the public may be willing to purchase
ever-greater levels of procedural fairness, people would be either unwilling or
sharply reluctant to commodify and sell the fundamental procedural justice afforded to them.
Figure 4 reveals support for this hypothesis that this conundrum results in a
taboo tradeoff and the problem of constitutive incommensurability. In Figure 1
and Table 2, the study demonstrated that most members of the public were willing to pay to enhance procedural justice—even when required to pay a small,
moderate, or large fee116—though, Figure 2 revealed that the extent of the public’s maximum WTP turned, in part, on the underlying value at stake. For example, participants were willing to pay greater amounts for procedural justice
in the child custody dispute than in the apartment rental or employment dispute.
Second, Figure 1, Table 2, and Figure 4 reveal that, while the public is
generally willing to pay for fair process, people are reluctant to sell basic protections to procedural fairness and are sharply resistant to downgrading to procedural injustice. Indeed, approximately 40 percent of participants rejected the
conception of selling fairness in at least one of the three scenarios, especially in
the child custody dispute. And participants who complied with our instruction
to list the minimum they would be willing to accept to downgrade to unfair
procedures monetized fairness at mountainously high values. As a result, the
chasm between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept widened to 300:1.
This 300:1 pattern is consistent with social-psychological literature on taboo tradeoffs, relational theory, and the sacred-value-protection model. This
social-psychological literature theorizes that people will experience a tradeoff
as forbidden when that tradeoff inappropriately extends a market-pricing
scheme into a domain normatively regulated by a communal-sharing scheme.
Members of the public experience procedural justice as a sacred and protected
value, one which all members of our society are entitled to share equally. That
is, procedural justice is normatively conceived of under a communal-sharing
scheme—as a fundamental human value or end guaranteed to all members of
society. As a result, asking participants to quantify, monetize, and sell the justice afforded to them pursuant to a market-pricing scheme impermissibly demanded participants to cross relational domains. The public experienced the
conundrum as a taboo procedural tradeoff.

116

These findings are consistent with another study involving a forced-choice paradigm and
procedural justice. See Mentovich, supra note 108.

Spring 2015]

PROCEDURAL JUSTICE TRADEOFFS

913

To be sure, prospect theory offers an alternative explanation for the WTPWTA differential, mainly the endowment effect.117 Behavioral economists have
consistently revealed endowment effects—divergences between maximum
willingness-to-pay and minimum willingness-to-accept.118 Studies on the endowment effect generally manipulate whether participants begin an experiment
with an endowment (or not) and later require participants to sell (or purchase)
that endowment. For example, seminal studies of the endowment effect manipulated whether participants began an experiment with a coffee mug (or not) and
later asked participants their WTA to sell (or WTP to purchase) the coffee mug.
These classic studies revealed that, because people are loss avoidant, the minimum WTA values commonly rose above the maximum WTP values. Even so,
these seminal studies revealed a WTP-WTA differential of 2:1, whereas later
studies revealed a differential of up to 4:1.119 Given that the present study reveals a 300:1 differential, the endowment effect and loss avoidance cannot fully
explain the size and magnitude of this effect.
Moreover, participants responded with moral outrage as predicted by the
sacred-value-protection model. When confronted with the taboo procedural
tradeoff in the child-custody dispute, a participant wrote, for example, “I would
prefer to have someone in authority actually listen and come to some logical
conclusion, rather than an option where I am treated as though I might as well
not even be there in the first place. I would feel very angry if I was to put my
trust in a legal system that would not allow me to explain why I want custody. I
would be angry if the court wasn’t respectful or used some objective criteria
for their decision. I would hate to put my fate in the hands of a judge that was
untrustworthy. All in all, it would be an incredibly bad decision to prefer
choice B [procedural injustice] over option A [procedural justice].” Another
participant wrote, “I would want the judge to be trustworthy and [to] treat me
fairly so that I feel like I have a fair chance at gaining custody of my kids. If the
judge was like Judge B [procedurally unfair] who knows what could happen? I
117

See Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20 J. LEGAL STUD.
225, 225–34 (1991); Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991) [hereinafter Kahneman et al.,
Anomalies]; Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1342–46 (1990) [hereinafter Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests]; Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 57, at 286–88; Jack L. Knetsch, The
Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves, 79 AM. ECON. REV.
1277 (1989); Russell B. Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 1227, 1231–42 (2003); Eldar Shafir, Prospect Theory and Political Analysis: A Psychological Perspective, 13 POL. PSYCHOL. 311, 311–17 (1992).
118
See Lyle Brenner et al., On the Psychology of Loss Aversion: Possession, Valence, and
Reversals of the Endowment Effect, 34 J. CONSUMER RES. 369 (2007); Eric J. Johnson et al.,
Aspects of Endowment: A Query Theory of Value Construction, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 461, 464–71 (2007); Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests, supra note 117.
119
See Horowitz & McConnell, supra note 109, at 426–33; Kahneman et al., Experimental
Tests, supra note 117; see also DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES
THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 168–69 (2010); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW
296 (2013).
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could lose my kids all together and I would feel like I had no chance and was
cheated.” Another participant wrote, “[W]hat’s the point of a court hearing if
you can’t explain your side of the story . . . . [A] rude judge would make me feel
like I wasn’t getting a fair deal just because of his attitude. Hard to be rude to
someone and also truly fair to them.” Similarly, another participant wrote, “The
selection is simple. Each litigant has a right to an impartial judge. Also, in the
event of the case being decided in favor of my wife, I will feel less inclined to
respect the decision if it is made in a harsh, unethical and biased manner. I
would expect my spouse to feel the same way if the decision went against her.
In addition, there is no benefit in taking Procedure B [procedural injustice]
when it will only cause an already awful situation and make it even worse.” Finally, many participants felt that payment to descend from procedural fairness
to procedural unfairness amounted to a taboo bribe; one participant wrote,
“Procedure A [procedural justice] will allow me to explain my reasoning and
have a fair chance. Procedure B [procedural injustice] is untrustworthy and
seems to be just trying to buy me out for a small fee.”
III. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This empirical legal study has illuminated how the public experiences
tradeoffs between procedural justice and cost. Our findings demonstrate that
the American public is willing to pay to enhance procedural fairness. Yet, the
public is largely unwilling to sell and exchange away the basic procedural justice bestowed to them, even when approached with small, medium, or large
payments to do so. Indeed, approximately 40 percent of participants refused to
monetize procedural justice in at least one of the three scenarios, primarily the
child custody dispute, refusing to designate any value that they would be willing to accept to descend from procedural justice to procedural injustice.120 Further, when members of the public designated minimum WTA values, these
minimum WTA values far outstripped their maximum WTP values, reflecting a
ratio of 300:1. Last, evidently context matters—these WTP-WTA values are
not absolute or static, but rather dynamic, varying with the context and underlying interests at stake.
This striking pattern is consistent with Tetlock’s and Baron’s research on
taboo tradeoffs and sacred values.121 As in psychological studies that examine
taboo tradeoffs, here, many members of the public experienced procedural justice as a value possessing “transcendental significance that precludes comparisons, trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or secular val120

As previously discussed, supra note 101, we designated participants who listed a WTA
value over $100,000,000, like those who refused to monetize fair process.
121
See Jonathan Baron & Joshua Greene, Determinants of Insensitivity to Quantity in Valuation of Public Goods: Contribution, Warm Glow, Budget Constraints, Availability, and
Prominence, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. APPLIED 107, 122–24 (1996); Fiske & Tetlock,
supra note 34, at 258–60; McGraw & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 3–4; Ritov & Baron, supra
note 34, at 79–82; Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 855–56.
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ues.”122 When participants were presented with proposed tradeoffs involving
selling procedural justice, we observed strong cognitive, affective, and behavioral reactance. The public sharply resisted selling procedural fairness and
translating procedural justice into market-value terms. This pattern is also consistent with the phenomenon of constitutive incommensurability and with predictions of the SVP model. The SVP model theorizes that, when the public believes that decisionmakers have contemplated fixing dollar values to sacred
values, the public will direct moral outrage at those who contemplated taboo
tradeoffs,123 for taboo tradeoffs undermine core assumptions central to our conceptions of self and our social relationships.124
These findings have important implications and complicate several areas of
procedural regulation, including the cost-benefit-analysis test envisioned by
Mathews v. Eldridge under the Due Process Clause, and new demands imposed
on parties under newly amended Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A. Reconceiving Procedural Regulation Under Mathews v. Eldridge
Psychological science on taboo tradeoffs reveals the incompleteness and
inadequacy of the cost-benefit model of procedural regulation conceived by
Mathews v. Eldridge under the Due Process Clause.125 The present study evidences that most members of the public experience procedural justice as sacred,
an end that cannot be legitimately balanced away for money. The public experiences certain forms of cost-benefit analysis of procedural safeguards as illegitimate, particularly when this cost-benefit analysis is used to rationalize diminishing, downgrading, and denying the procedural justice furnished to
them.126 This human psychological phenomenon complicates rigid application
of Mathews v. Eldridge.
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court wove into the Due Process
Clause a cost-benefit standard that balances the benefit of procedural safeguards against their cost. Specifically, the Mathews Court called upon courts,
when analyzing the sufficiency of legal safeguards under the Due Process
Clause, to: first, consider the private interest affected by official action; second,
consider the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used; and finally, weigh the government’s interest, including the cost that
substitute procedural safeguards would entail.127

122
123
124

61.

See Tetlock et al., supra note 33, at 853.
Id. at 853–56.
Id. at 853–54; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 34, at 255–61; Tetlock, supra note 76, 451–

125
See Will M. Bennis et al., The Costs and Benefits of Calculation and Moral Rules, 5
PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 187 (2010).
126
See id.
127
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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Over the past several decades, Mathews v. Eldridge’s cost-benefit calculus
has been the object of considerable ire and critique. Some have criticized
Mathews’s cost-benefit standard as inconsistent with original jurisprudential
understandings of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses—
for balancing as an explicit mode of constitutional interpretation did not even
evolve until the late 1930s.128 Some have criticized the standard as unworkable
given the incommensurability of values at stake—human life, health, and safety, for example, versus the direct cost of legal procedures.129 Relatedly, others
have contended that the Court’s cost-benefit standard requires (and yet cloaks)
troubling subjectivity—for judges implicitly weigh, characterize, and calculate
costs and benefits highly subjectively, and costs and benefits vary in the eyes of
each beholder.130
One of the finest critiques, and in my view the most decisive, was leveled
long ago by Professor Jerry Mashaw who charged that the Mathews Court’s
single-minded focus on decisional accuracy neglects and conceals other humanistic concerns in the pantheon of human values and experiences.131
Mashaw eloquently argued that procedural justice, including the right to be
heard, matter not only because voice and the opportunity to be heard “contribute to an accurate determination, but also because a lack of personal participation causes alienation and a loss of that dignity and self respect that society
properly deems independently valuable.”132 Since Mashaw, others have criticized the Court’s narrow focus on decisional accuracy as excluding other human values.133 For example, Professor Charles Koch has reasoned that fairness
128

See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 948–63 (1987).
129
See Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV.
1044, 1138 (1984); Sunstein, supra note 63, 839–53. For general a discussion of this problem in law, see Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 1371 (1998); Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53 (1992);
Rowell, supra note 63.
130
See Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33
STAN. L. REV. 387, 401–22 (1981); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 369 (1985)
(Brennan, J. dissenting) (Balancing tests are “not a neutral, utilitarian calculus but an unanalyzed exercise of judicial will.”); see also FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING,
PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 9 (2004).
[T]here is no reason to think that the right answers will emerge from the strange process of assigning dollar values to human life, human health, and nature itself, and then crunching the
numbers. Indeed, in pursuing this approach, formal cost-benefit analysis often hurts more than it
helps: it muddies rather than clarifies fundamental clashes about values.

Id.
131

See Mashaw, supra note 5, at 39–57.
See id. Kant, who famously wrote that humans as rational beings have dignity, “elevated
above all price, and admits of no equivalent.” IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 52–53 (1785).
133
See e.g., Cynthia Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189 (1991);
Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 44 (1992). Some scholars
have argued that efficiency (defined as welfare or wealth maximization) should be the primary or sole criterion in evaluating justice. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness
132
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is a fundamental value—one neglected by the Mathews Court—as are ends
such as legitimacy, dignity, and equality.134 Further, one of the chief difficulties
with cost-benefit analysis is the very practice of monetizing values that society
regards as sacred; monetizing these values interferes with them, leading us to
think of these human ends as ordinary tastes and preferences, like those that we
consume in the course of our everyday lives.135 In short, the underinclusive
analysis in Mathews leaves no room for the plurality of human ends and moral
intuitions beyond wealth-maximizing efficiency, including the sense that law
may be unjust even if wealth maximizing.136
These findings and psychological research on taboo tradeoffs, support
Mashaw’s sweeping critique of the Court’s Due Process cost-benefit calculus.
First, the public believes that the aegis of the Constitution guarantees them fundamental fairness and procedural justice. Second, members of the public are
largely unwilling to sacrifice procedural justice for money. Thus, the singleminded focus of the Mathews formulation on decisional accuracy and cost
leaves no room to consider the public’s human concern for procedural justice
and dignity, and the public’s psychological experience of taboo procedural
tradeoffs. The public experiences procedural justice as sacred, not commensurable with the direct cost of procedures, not easily monetized, and not easily
balanced away for money. Moreover, this empirical legal study revealed a wide
willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept discrepancy. As such, any balance
between procedural justice and cost will turn on whether a decisionmaker characterizes procedural justice as a minimum default guaranteed to the American
public, versus a contested baseline that the public must pay for.137 Lastly, by
according no legal or analytical significance to the American public’s experience of procedural fairness, the Mathews formulation leaves no room for the

versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2000). In contrast, Matthew D. Adler has offered an
account of cost-benefit analysis that incorporates intuitions about and experiences of fairness. See MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS (2012).
134
See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Community of Interest in the Due Process Calculus, 37 HOUS.
L. REV. 635 (2000).
135
See Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, 5 REGULATION 33, 36–
40 (1981); Douglas MacLean, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Procedural Values, 16 ANALYSE &
KRITIK 166, 171–79 (1994).
136
Robin West powerfully elaborated the latter argument in her recent text. See ROBIN
WEST, TEACHING LAW: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND THE DEMANDS OF PROFESSIONALISM 82–84
(2013) (discussing the effect on the law of narrow conceptions of justice, which, by focusing
on certain evaluative criteria like efficiency and utility, neglect equally important principles
such as human flourishing and well-being); see also Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency? A
Response to Professors Calabresi and Posner, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1979); Mark Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 WISC. L. REV. 769 (1979); Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory
and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393 (1981); Robin L. West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and
Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985).
137
See Kelman, supra note 135; MacLean, supra note 122; Kennedy, supra note 130.
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expressive function of law,138 no door ajar for courts to express the sacred,
symbolic, deeply human significance of procedural justice.139
In short, the public’s experience of taboo procedural tradeoffs illuminates
the incompleteness of Mathews v. Eldridge’s narrow cost-benefit formulation
of the Due Process Clause—particularly when the state revokes procedural justice to avoid the cost of providing just safeguards. The Mathews v. Eldridge
standard conceives of the “benefit” of fair process solely as enhancing decisional accuracy. Yet this conception grants no conceptual or analytical weight,
when balancing costs and benefits, to the human dignity and fairness concerns
interwoven with the public’s experience of procedural justice. Troublingly,
while Due Process is at its root about furnishing individuals fairness and safeguarding human dignity,140 these human ends are neither quantified, nor even
qualitatively considered within Mathews v. Eldridge’s Due Process framework.
The chasm between the Mathews Court’s single-minded focus on decisional accuracy and a more capacious concern for human values and experiences,
including human dignity, is untenable and ironic. At present, courts are prevented from considering human dignity and fairness under Mathews v. Eldridge’s conception of the Due Process Clause. In marked contrast, federal
agencies are strongly encouraged by executive order141 to “consider (and discuss qualitatively) values that are difficult or impossible to quantify, including
equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts” when engaging in
cost-benefit analysis of regulation.142 Troublingly, courts have fallen behind
federal agencies as the expositors of human dignity and fairness, especially
when just safeguards are at stake. Like federal agencies, courts should aspire to
consider, either quantitatively or qualitatively, human dignity and fairness under the Due Process Clause when the state revokes procedural justice from the
public.

138

See Sunstein, supra note 63, at 824.
When evaluating a legal rule, we might ask whether the rule expresses an appropriate valuation
of an event, person, group, or practice. . . .
....
. . . When the Court makes a decision, it is often taken to be speaking on behalf of the nation’s
basic principles and commitments. This is a matter of importance quite apart from consequences,
conventionally understood. It is customary and helpful to point to the Court’s educative effect.
But perhaps its expressive effect, or its expressive character, better captures what is often at
stake.

Id.
139

See Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 792–804 (1990).
See supra note 15; see generally COVER & FISS, supra note 1; DWORKIN, supra note 1;
Fuller, supra note 1, at 372–75, 388; Hart, supra note 1, at 185; Resnik, supra note 7; Rawls,
Justice as Fairness, supra note 1; Rawls, Legal Obligation, supra note 1.
141
See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011); see also Exec. Order No.
13,70_, 80 Fed. Reg. __ (signed Sep. 15, 2015) (“Using Behavioral Science Insights to Better Serve the American People”).
142
See Sunstein, supra note 14; see also Bayefsky, supra note 14.
140
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Thus, we concur with Professor Gary Lawson, who has concluded that the
Mathews formulation must be re-conceptualized, as it once was,143 as a framework for structuring discussions and deliberations about fairness, rather than a
strict, albeit underinclusive, mathematical formula. To begin, Mathews should
not be rigidly applied as an algorithm of costs and benefits—the seeming mathematical precision conceals and cloaks the indeterminacy and incommensurability of the human values at stake.144 Further, the Mathews framework should
be widened to explicitly encompass considerations of human dignity, fairness,
and the public’s experience of manifest procedural injustice. One charge
against the Mathews cost-benefit balancing is the concern that courts strike
procedural tradeoffs subjectively, and that political ideology affects balancing.145 In this regard, considerable psychological evidence demonstrates that
decisionmakers implicitly adjust the costs and benefits of different alternatives
consistent with their own anticipated affective reactions to different predicted
consequences.146
Psychological science offers a means of navigating beyond both the current
calculus’s troubling subjectivity and the Mathews Court’s neglect of the public’s experiences of procedural injustice. Not only should courts evaluate
whether the public experiences procedural injustice, but courts should harness
the best empirical and experimental science available to reveal how the public
experiences different civil processes proposed. Courts and procedural regulators should allow parties to proffer psychological evidence on manifest procedural injustice when the minimum level of procedural safeguards is being set
under the Due Process Clause for a particular class of disputes. In this way,
fairness under the Due Process Clause can be re-conceptualized from an intui143

See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 17 (1978); Smith v.
Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 848–49 (1977); Dixon v. Love,
431 U.S. 105, 112–13 (1977); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977). The decision
later acquired the air of mathematical precision. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S.
18, 27 (1981); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
144
See Bennis et al., supra note 125; Kennedy, supra note 130, at 422–44; Barry Schwartz,
The Limits of Cost-Benefit Calculation: Commentary on Bennis, Medin, & Bartels (2010), 5
PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 203 (2010); cf. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 130.
To say that life, health, and nature are priceless is not to say that we should spend an infinite amount of money to protect them. Rather, it is to say that translating life, health, and nature
into dollars is not a fruitful way of deciding how much protection to given them. A different way
of thinking and deciding about them is required.

Id.
145

See Christopher J. Schmidt, Ending the Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing Test: Time for a
New Due Process Test, 38 SW. L. REV. 287, 292 (2008) (stating that legal balancing scale
should not “consist of judges’ personal views, unless constitutional law is to return to the
‘locknerizing era’ ”); see also Curtis E. Harris, An Undue Burden: Balancing in an Age of
Relativism, 18 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 363, 400 (1993) (“Balancing tests inevitably become
intertwined with the ideological predispositions of those doing the balancing . . . .” (quoting
John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing
in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1501 (1975))).
146
See generally Richard L. Wiener et al., Emotion and the Law: A Framework for Inquiry,
30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 231 (2006).
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tive, rationalistic (yet highly subjective) concept to one closely connected empirically to the experiences of parties, claimants, and recipients of social benefits affected by state action. In this way, fairness and human dignity under the
Due Process Clause may shift from benefits that were once discounted and disregarded to benefits that are appreciated, validated, and verified.147
Psychological science can reveal whether the class of claimants most affected by procedural deprivations experiences those procedural deprivations as
manifestly unjust. In this context, the public’s experience of manifest procedural injustice should be deemed of the utmost significance when resolving proposed tradeoffs between fairness and cost. When psychological science demonstrates that the public experiences injustice, a new Procedural Due Process test
must grant these experiences of procedural injustice legal significance, connecting the empirical evidence, analytically to decisionmaking under the Due
Process Clause.
In granting analytical and legal significance to the benefits of procedural
justice, fairness, and human dignity, there are at least three paths forward.148 To
begin, when a claimant challenges the constitutionality of particular procedural
safeguards, rather than conducting a strict cost-benefit analysis per se, courts
may conduct a break-even analysis, as Cass Sunstein has elsewhere described.149 Federal agencies conduct break-even analysis when the benefits of
regulatory action are difficult to monetize.150 While the direct cost of substitute
procedural safeguards can be readily appraised and valued, procedural justice
and human dignity are exceedingly difficult to monetize. When conducting a
break-even analysis, the crucial question would be: What would the benefits of
the substitute procedural safeguards have to be in order to justify the costs?
Under the break-even analysis, courts should consider the number of similarlysituated individuals affected by state action and capaciously consider the benefits of procedural justice, fairness, and human dignity to these members of the
public. Secondly, when the state seeks to descend from procedurally just to
procedurally unjust safeguards to save direct costs, the Mathews v. Eldridge
cost-benefit formulation could perhaps be retained by expanding the conception
of the “costs” of procedural injustice. In this scenario, given the deregulatory
nature of state action, the “benefit” would be avoiding the cost or expense of
147

William James described this pragmatic way of discerning the truth of a concept as follows “The moment pragmatism asks this question, it sees the answer: True ideas are those
that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot.” JAMES, supra note 2, at 138. Fairness, like other concepts, can be put to the empirical
test by drawing on procedural justice and social psychological methods.
148
We offer these paths as plausible avenues to the destination. We leave for another day
how one might begin to evaluate and select between them. For a discussion of similar proposals in the administrative agency context, see the following excellent student note. See
Bayefsky, supra note 14.
149
See generally Sunstein, supra note 14; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE:
HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY STATE 65–84 (2014).
150
See supra Part II.B.2.c.
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just procedures, while the “cost” would be the harms flowing from procedural
injustice. If courts absolutely must monetize the costs of injustice, courts
should draw on WTA values, rather than WTP values, to fully capture the
breadth of psychological and societal harms and costs. Indeed, in this scenario,
WTA values are more normatively and morally defensible than WTP values—
all humans are endowed with human dignity.151 The relevant question would
be: Do the proposed cost savings exceed the willingness-to-accept values of the
population asked to descend from procedural justice to injustice? Last and perhaps best, rather than retaining the Mathews v. Eldridge cost-benefit standard,
when the state’s procedural safeguards are so deficient that the public experiences manifest procedural injustice, this manifest injustice should be granted
legal significance by invoking a lexical,152 threshold rule that diminishes other
considerations.153 Under this approach, when the population affected experiences manifest injustice, the process applied should be presumed deficient and
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause.
In the decades since the Mathews Court elaborated on the cost-benefit approach under the Due Process Clause, experimental psychologists have developed the scientific means to measure and report the public’s experience of procedural injustice,154 rendering the form of introspection conducted under the
151

See KANT, supra note 132 (observing that human beings are endowed with dignity, a
value that cannot be bought or replaced). Theories of justice and human dignity have been
explored from the beginning of human civilization to the present day. See generally PLATO,
THE REPUBLIC “Books I-V” (380 BCE); ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS (350 BCE);
CICERO, DE LEGIBUS (42 BCE); THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (1274), DAVID
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (1739); IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL
REASON (1788); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); ROBERT A NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE AND UTOPIA (1974); SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY (1989);
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE
(1997); AMARTYA K. SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (2009); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING
CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2011).
152
John Rawls describes a lexical rule as one that
requires us to satisfy the first principle in the ordering before we can move on to the second, the
second before we consider the third, and so on. A principles does not come into play until those
previous to it are either fully met or do not apply. A serial ordering avoids, then, having to balance principles at all; those earlier in the ordering have an absolute weight, so to speak, with respect to later ones, and hold without exception.

RAWLS, supra note 72, at 43. In this way, one might designate the public’s experience of
procedural injustice as a lexical rule, meaning the Court would move on to further inquiry
only if the public does not experience manifest procedural injustice.
153
See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 88–96 (1864).
Is, then, the difference between the Just and the Expedient a merely imaginary distinction?
Have mankind been under a delusion in thinking that justice is a more sacred thing than policy
. . . ? By no means. . . . [A]nd no one of those who profess the most sublime contempt for the
consequences of actions as an element in their morality, attaches more importance to the distinction than I do. . . . Justice remains the appropriate name for certain social utilities which are
vastly more important, and therefore more absolute and imperative, than any others are as a
class.

Id. (emphasis added).
154
For an outstanding recent example of such an empirical legal study, see Shestowsky, supra note 56. For additional examples, see Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants’
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Mathews formulation inexcusable. For example, the National Center for State
Courts (NCSC) has made available excellent tools that measure the public’s
experiences of access and fairness, tools already widely in use.155 Similar instruments may be adapted for considering not only experiences with court procedures, but the public’s experience with the safeguards afforded to it under the
Due Process Clause. As Judge Burke, one of the leading proponents of procedural justice reform, has aptly said, “For courts to build public trust and enhance the legitimacy of judicial decision making, there must be a willingness to
commit to measuring procedural fairness.”156
As this empirical legal study suggests, the public has marked difficulty
trading procedural justice against cost, particularly when procedural tradeoffs
dilute procedural fairness. Therefore, when Mathews v. Eldridge is harnessed to
justify diminishing procedural safeguards, the public will likely perceive that
downgrade as a taboo procedural tradeoff. In turn, the public may respond with
moral outrage. Unfortunately, courts and procedural regulators that strike taboo
procedural tradeoffs may attempt to avoid public outrage by concealing their
actions from public scrutiny. Psychological literature demonstrates that, when
the public believes that decisionmakers have struck a forbidden tradeoff, the
public will likely respond with harsh dispositional attributions and anger. Decisionmakers may, therefore, attempt to conceal or obfuscate forbidden procedural tradeoffs. Decisionmakers may, for example, attempt to increase the
opaqueness of cost-benefit analysis to conceal tradeoffs from public view. Ironically, by omitting explicit consideration of procedural fairness, the Mathews
formula itself conceals taboo procedural tradeoffs from the public. Courts and
procedural regulators should instead acknowledge the public’s confusion, anger, and angst that naturally, and sensibly, follow when the public learns of decisions that involve trading procedural justice against cost. The public’s reacPerceptions of Dispute Resolution Procedures: An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal Empirical Study, 41 CONN L. REV. 63, 74 n.46 (2008) (employing a longitudinal design to compare
the ex ante and ex post evaluations of disputants involved in legal procedures and concluding
that just one past study examined disputants’ ex ante evaluations); Lamont E. Stallworth &
Linda K. Stroh, Who Is Seeking to Use ADR? Why Do They Choose to Do So?, DISP. RESOL.
J., Jan.–Mar. 1996, at 30, 33–35 (using data from disputants with pending disputes to explore
ex ante attitudes about procedures); see also E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder:
Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 953 (1990); Debra L. Shapiro & Jeanne M. Brett, Comparing Three Processes
Underlying Judgments of Procedural Justice: A Field Study of Mediation and Arbitration,
65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1167 (1993).
155
See CourTools, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., http://www.courtools.org (last visited Apr.
29, 2015). As well, Nancy Welsh, Donna Stienstra, and Bobbi McAdoo have designed an
excellent survey tool for settlement sessions, which could in theory be tailored for the Procedural Due Process context. See Nancy Welsh et al., The Application of Procedural Justice
Research to Judicial Actions and Techniques in Settlement Sessions, in THE MULTI-TASKING
JUDGE: COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION Appendix, chp. 4 (Tania Sourdin &
Archie Zariski eds., 2013).
156
See Kevin S. Burke, A Vision for Enhancing Public Confidence in the Judiciary, 95
JUDICATURE 251, 253 (2012).
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tions should not be derided as mere self-interest, bias, or resistance. Instead, we
must encourage frank, open, and engaged deliberation between decisionmakers
and the public, deliberation committed to crafting common solutions to our
shared problems. We must encourage courts and procedural regulators to become familiar with the public’s experiences of procedural injustice and how the
public experiences taboo procedural tradeoffs.
B. Exploring the Psychological Difficulties Woven Into Newly Amended Rule 1
The phenomenon of taboo procedural tradeoffs also casts light on underappreciated psychological difficulties woven into newly amended Rule 1.
Amended Rule 1 was recently approved by the Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court and has been conveyed to Congress for final review.157 Whereas
Rule 1 was previously directed at judges and served largely as an interpretive
tool to resolve ambiguity within the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, newly
amended Rule 1 is now directed at claimants and defendants and requires them
to experience and engage in procedural tradeoffs. As amended, Rule 1 will
state: the rules “should be construed, administered, and employed by . . . the
parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”158
In amending Rule 1, the drafters sought to promote “cooperation in reducing unnecessary costs in civil litigation”159—a laudable aim. Yet conferring
procedural justice—a neutral and trustworthy forum where claimants are fully
granted a voice and heard, a forum in which claimants are treated with the utmost dignity and respect—and reducing costs to defendants and courts are in
tension. While newly amended Rule 1 requires parties to reduce unnecessary
costs, claimants and defendants will doubtless disagree on whether costs expended to promote procedural fairness are necessary.160 For example, our findings reveal that claimants will likely experience as taboo the practice of sacrificing procedural justice to save the cost borne on defendants and courts. When
these competing dynamics are present, newly amended Rule 1 may compel
claimants to experience and strike tradeoffs that violate normative beliefs about
the value of justice. Forcing the public to engage in this cost-benefit logic may
157

See Memorandum and Letter of Transmittal, supra note 9.
Id. at B-21 (emphasis added).
159
The drafters contextualized the rule, stating: “[t]his change should be combined with
continuing efforts to educate litigants and courts on the importance of cooperation in reducing unnecessary costs in civil litigation.” Id. at B-13. This commentary reveals an implicit
connection between the efficiency rationale and cost reduction, a seemingly synonymous
nature between the two. Brooke D. Coleman has recently referred to this implicit contiguity
between these two concepts as the efficiency norm in civil procedure. See Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 5 (2015).
160
See George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993); David M. Messick et al., Why We Are Fairer Than
Others, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 480 (1985); Don A. Moore et al., Conflict of
Interest and the Intrusion of Bias, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 37 (2010).
158
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result in moral outrage, reducing satisfaction with federal adjudication and potentially diminishing our civil justice system’s perceived legitimacy.
Further, clients and lawyers hold different perspectives about civil process.161 Socio-legal scholars have theorized that lawyers and their clients comprise different legal cultures, which fundamentally shape beliefs and values
about the legal process.162 Insofar as courts, lawyers, and members of the public experience the tradeoffs envisioned in Rule 1 differently, these different experiences underscore epistemological tension inherent within newly amended
Rule 1. Which logic-in-use should be privileged? Put differently, how one experiences monetizing procedural justice will likely turn on one’s distinct legal
culture.
To be sure, lawyers are gatekeepers who channel the public through our
civil justice, while shaping client perceptions and behaviors.163 Here, the
Committee Note appears to be directed at lawyers: “Effective advocacy is consistent with—and indeed depends upon—cooperative and proportional use of
procedure.”164 While cooperation is doubtless admirable, if by cooperation, attorneys will be tasked with explaining to claimants why they must sacrifice
their client’s voice to reduce the system-wide cost of litigation, this form of
promoting cooperation to reduce cost is wrought with psychological difficulty.
Further, courts must tread with caution in applying newly amended Rule 1 to
unrepresented litigants because pro se litigants are even more likely to experience Rule 1 as requiring taboo procedural tradeoffs.
Newly amended Rule 1 is animated by an implicit normative behavioral
theory165 of how parties should navigate the civil justice system (procedural
fairness, except when costly), which may fail as a descriptive behavioral theory
of how parties in fact experience the civil justice system, especially when the
competing ends of procedural fairness and efficiency are in tension. Federal
courts must proceed with caution when applying newly amended Rule 1. Robust, rigid application of amended Rule 1 will fail the test of behavioral realism166 and likely dampen the perceived legitimacy of federal adjudication.

161

See AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS:
POWER & MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 5 (1995); Austin Sarat & William L. F. Felstiner,
Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Motive in Lawyer/Client Interaction, 22 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 737 (1988); see also Howard S. Erlanger et al., Participation and Flexibility in
Informal Processes: Cautions from the Divorce Context, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 585 (1987).
162
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 1998); Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Culture and the Welfare State, in DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE
WELFARE STATE 13, 17 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1988).
163
See SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note 161.
164
See Memorandum, supra note 9, at B-13.
165
See generally Krieger & Fiske, supra note 27.
166
See id.
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C. Reinvigorating Civil Procedure Pedagogy
Beyond offering insight into both courts and procedural regulators, law and
psychological science research holds immense pedagogical value.167 First and
foremost, psychological science on social cognition, judgment and decisionmaking, emotion, attitudes and persuasion, memory, social influence, cognitive-dissonance, prejudice, stereotyping, discrimination, social justice, and
procedural justice168—and the scientific method harnessed to amass these powerful psychological insights—holds the promise of improving how we teach legal subject matter, including civil procedure. Indeed, as John Dewey sagely
wrote in Experience and Education,
[I]t is a sound educational principle that students should be introduced to scientific subject-matter and be initiated into its facts and laws through acquaintance
with everyday social applications. . . . [I]t is impossible to obtain an understanding of present social forces (without which they cannot be mastered and directed) apart from an education which leads learners into knowledge of the very
same facts and principles which in their final organization constitute the sciences.169

Dewey later concludes,
I see at bottom but two alternatives between which education must choose if it is
not to drift aimlessly. One of them is expressed by the attempt to induce educators to return to the intellectual methods and ideals that arose centuries before
scientific method was developed. . . . [I]t is so out of touch with all the conditions of modern life that I believe it is folly to seek salvation in that direction.
The other alternative is systematic utilization of scientific method as the pattern
and ideal of intelligent exploration and exploitation of the potentialities inherent
in experience.170

In the main, we can improve legal pedagogy by weaving the mind sciences,
including powerful psychological insights, into our curricula and by teaching
our law students the scientific and experimental method.
From one perspective, students are exposed early on in law school to both
the importance of a fair process when resolving disputes and basic fairness, as
both a moral and legal necessity applied to a wide range of legal procedures.171
167

See Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Psychology and Effective Lawyering:
Insights for Legal Educators, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365, 366 (2015) (“Psychology—the science
of how people think, feel, and behave—has a great deal to teach about a range of core competencies related to working with people and making good decisions. . . . Despite the importance of interpersonal aspects of lawyering and the utility of psychology for mastering . . .
the profession, law school curricula include relatively little psychology.” (footnote omitted)).
168
For an outstanding and timely example on how to weave these social-psychological concepts into the legal curriculum, see JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT,
PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS (2012); Sternlight & Robbennolt, supra note 167.
169
JOHN DEWEY, THE LATER WORKS 1925–1953, at 53–54 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1988).
170
Id. at 58.
171
See WEST, supra note 136, at 48. Owen Fiss and Judith Resnik have harnessed moral
values as a guide to their pedagogy and scholarship. See OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNIK,
ADJUDICATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: AN INTRODUCTION TO PROCEDURE (2003); see also
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Too often, however, civil procedure scholars do not teach law students about
the competing ends and tradeoffs inherent within the rules of procedure and our
civil justice system.172 When civil procedure scholars do, we may inadvertently
normalize the form of underinclusive cost-benefit analysis articulated in
Mathews v. Eldridge. With the sea change increase in binding consumer arbitration, we must also guard against normalizing the tradeoffs struck when procedural justice is lost upon binding arbitration clauses buried in consumer contracts.
When law students first learn about legal process, many have marked difficulty grasping cost-benefit analysis—particularly when cost-benefit analysis is
used to legitimize diminishing procedural safeguards without considering the
benefits of procedural justice, and even more so when cost-benefit analysis is
used to justify legal process that feels manifestly unjust. This research suggests
that this difficulty may be, in part, attributable to different legal cultures of
knowledge: internal (the legal culture of lawyers and judges) and external (the
legal culture of the population at large).173 Before socialization in the legal
academy, law students may experience fair process and procedural justice as
sacred, of transcendental and infinite significance. Civil procedure pedagogy
may socialize law students to reconceive of legal process in more instrumental,
consequential, and perhaps even market-price terms. Yet, when law students
enter the academy, many likely conceive of procedural justice, and other conceptions of justice, in more humanistic terms.
As teachers of civil procedure, we should recall that, when law students enter the academy, they enter from a different legal culture with a different perspective. The sacred-value-protection model suggests that different cultures
will classify different values as sacred. While our internal legal culture may
monetize legal procedures into secular terms,174 external legal culture, includCOVER, FISS & RESNIK, supra note 7; Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 2219 (1989).
172
Professor Morrison has eloquently written about this deficiency. See Morrison, supra
note 7. Robert Cover and Owen Fiss discussed competing aims of the civil justice system
and related tradeoffs in their excellent work, which explored themes of meta-procedure. See
COVER & FISS, supra note 1.
173
See Friedman, supra note 162.
The legal system, in short, is a ship that sails the seas of social force. And the concept of
legal culture is crucial to an understanding of legal development. By legal culture, we mean the
ideas, attitudes, values, and beliefs that people hold about the legal system. . . . One should also
distinguish between internal legal culture . . . and external.

Id.
174

See Marc Galanter, Notes on the Future of Social Research in Law, in LAW & SOCIETY:
READINGS ON THE SOCIAL STUDY OF LAW 25, 25–26 (Stewart Macaulay et al. eds., 1995).
Legal scholars and professionals, while accentuating various differences with one another, display a broad agreement about the nature of legal phenomena. I refer [to] adherence, usually tacit
to a set of propositions which, taken together, provide a cognitive map or paradigm of legal reality. . . . The rules (authoritative normative learning) represent (reflects, expresses, embodies, refines) general (widely-shared, dominant) social preferences (values, norms, interests).

Id.
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ing the public and fledgling law students entering the academy, hold more humanistic intuitions about procedural fairness and procedural justice.
As such, we must teach the tension and thorns associated with monetizing
fair process. To be sure, the public, and many of the clients that law students
will eventually serve, may experience the same difficulty that law students
themselves once faced. Drawing on the best research available within the mind
sciences, we should teach students about the underlying psychology and the affective processes that occur when disputants experience these tradeoffs, the difficulties that decisionmakers experience when striking taboo procedural
tradeoffs, and about procedural justice.175 Finally, I concur with Professor Jean
R. Sternlight and Jennifer K. Robbennolt, who recently concluded that civil
procedure courses would be enhanced by teaching about the “the psychology
relating to perception, justice, discovery, persuasion, or negotiation in order to
help students consider how to evaluate claims and defenses, how best to resolve
clients’ disputes, or how to present arguments most effectively.”176
CONCLUSION
Having discussed the findings of this first phase of the research line, and
having thereby begun to illuminate how the public perceives taboo procedural
tradeoffs, we now discuss limitations and next steps.
First, we manipulated procedural justice by simultaneously varying voice
and opportunity to be heard, a neutral and trustworthy decisionmaker, and being treated with dignity and respect. Nonetheless, the public may experience
these distinct components of procedural justice differently. Moreover, although
these concepts were simultaneously manipulated to provide an unfair procedural option, altering one of these concepts at a time, or several of these concepts
together rather than all at once, may influence the public’s WTP and WTA values. Further studies will explore the possibility that fewer than all of these constructs can together form either fair process or unfair process and affect the
WTP and WTA values.
Second, we conducted this program of research with members of the
American lay public, which is largely comprised of one-shot litigation players,
rather than repeat players.177 Research, however, suggests that repeat players,
such as lenders, liability insurers, and general counsel who handle numerous
disputes across many different forums with many different procedures, may
experience tradeoffs between procedural justice and cost in economic and bureaucratic-processing terms.178 Indeed, repeat players may be willing to pay

175

See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 32; Sternlight & Robbennolt, supra note 167, at 382.
See Sternlight & Robbennolt, supra note 167, at 382.
177
See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98–108 (1974).
178
See H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT (1970).
176
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more for procedural justice than one-shot players in strategically selected cases,
given the cascading effect of procedures across many of the disputes they initiate or defend.179 At the same time, repeat players may be willing to accept far
less than the lay public to sell off procedural justice, as repeat players may
more readily conceive of procedures in secular and economic terms. This distinction between one-shot players and repeat players warrants further empirical
inquiry.
Third, this particular study used self-report measures and participants’ freewritten responses. While participants wrote charged emotional statements in
their free-responses questions, in the future, we plan to employ more precise
psycho-physiological devices to measure the angst and outrage that the public
experiences. This is an additional direction of the present research study.
Finally, with regard to method, in this phase of the research, we employed
experimentally-manipulated vignettes. While experiments that harness vignettes have high internal validity, these vignette studies may lack in external
validity. In the future, we aim to bridge from lab studies to field studies.
In closing, while fairness is a foundational concept, debate surrounds how
best to reconcile the competing ends of our civil justice system. In this article,
we have drawn on psychological science and experimental methods to examine
how members of the public experience tradeoffs between procedural justice and
cost. Our empirical legal study revealed, first, that the public is willing to pay
to upgrade from procedural unfairness to procedural fairness. The empirical legal study, however, revealed that the lay public largely rejects accepting money
to downgrade from procedural justice to procedural injustice—the public is
largely unwilling to sell the fundamental justice afforded to them and unwilling
to accept money for procedural injustice.180 While we found that willingnessto-pay and willingness-to-accept values varied with the underlying interest at
stake, our study ultimately found that when members of the public designated
minimum WTA values, these minimum WTA values eclipsed related maximum WTP values. In this way, we have revealed that the public experiences
In order to process successfully vast numbers of cases, organizations tend to take on the
characteristics of “bureaucracy” in the sociological sense of the term . . . . Such an organizational form produces competence and efficiency in applying general rules to particular cases, but it
is not well suited to making complex and individualized decisions.

Id. at 237; Robert M. Hayden, The Cultural Logic of a Political Crisis: Common Sense, Hegemony and the Great American Liability Insurance Famine of 1986, in 11 STUDIES IN LAW,
POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 95, 95–117 (1991).
179
See Welsh et al., supra note 155, at 68–69 (“The assessments of judges, lawyers, and
other repeat players make of outcome fairness . . . are influenced more by their expectations
of the outcomes they should receive than by their perceptions of procedural justice.”); see
also JANE W. ADLER ET AL., SIMPLE JUSTICE: HOW LITIGANTS FARE IN THE PITTSBURGH
COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM 83 (1983) (finding repeat players who made extensive use of
the court-connected arbitration program appeared to care little about “qualitative aspects of
the hearing process. They judge arbitration primarily on the basis of the outcomes it delivers”).
180
See supra Part II.
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the psychological phenomenon of taboo procedural tradeoffs. In the main, the
public will experience a taboo procedural tradeoff when the procedural justice
furnished to the public descends to procedural injustice, and when this descent
is rationalized as avoiding monetary costs.
As John Stuart Mill sagely observed in the final words of his magnum
opus,
Justice remains the appropriate name for certain social utilities which are vastly
more important, and therefore more absolute and imperative, than any others are
as a class . . . and which, therefore, ought to be, as well as naturally are, guarded
by a sentiment not only different in degree, but also in kind; distinguished from
the milder feeling which attaches to the mere idea of promoting human pleasure
or convenience, at once by the more definite nature of its commands, and by the
sterner character of its sanctions.181

The public experiences the secular value of money and the sacred end of justice
as incommensurable. For our civil justice system to be experienced as legitimate, we must not sacrifice and exchange the procedural justice bestowed on
the American public for manifest procedural injustice to save direct costs.

181

MILL, supra note 153, at 96.

